The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo

Autorentext
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, USA. He formerly served as national security assistant to Senator John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a military analyst for ABC News. A frequent commentator on National Public Radio, he is the author of numerous books on security issues and has served in a number of senior positions in the US government.

Klappentext

The conclusion of a war typically signals the beginning of a flood of memoirs and instant campaign histories, many presenting the purported, but often dubious lessons of the recent conflict. Cordesman is careful to avoid such pitfalls in this detailed and closely reasoned analysis, and helps us to begin to understand the implications of this dramatic conflict on its own terms. Based on a combination of official and unofficial (but always authoritative) sources, he builds a thorough case for the true lessons of NATO's first battle fought within Europe.

After consideration of the historical, major political, and strategic factors that set the stage for the Kosovo campaign, Cordesman critically examines the actual effectiveness of the NATO air campaigns, both in Kosovo and Serbia proper. Operations in this rugged part of Europe were difficult, and compounding the challenges of terrain and weather were the conflicting national agendas within the Allied coalition that seriously hampered focused and decisive action by NATO. Although Milosevic ultimately conceded defeat, all of these factors played an important role in limiting the intensity and shaping the military outcome of the campaign, and the likely political and strategic results were far from certain. Cordesman unflinchingly concludes, that the air campaign over Kosovo exposed deep fault lines within and among the NATO countries and fundamental flaws in the way the West wages war.

Zusammenfassung
A critical examination of NATO's 1999 Kosovo campaign against Serbia. After a consideration of the historical, political and strategic factors that set the stage for the campaign, it explores the actual effectiveness of the NATO air campaigns, both in Kosovo and Serbia proper.

Inhalt

The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the NATO Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo
The Historical Background: The Course and Character of the NATO Campaign
The Grand Strategic Aspects of Kosovo: The "Whys" and "Hows" of the War and the Implications for Strategy and Force Planning
The Strategic Impact and Military Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign
The Problems of "Perfect" and "Bloodless" War
NATO Reporting on the Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign
Strategic Bombing
The Air and Missile War and Serbian Air and Land Force Targets
The "Ground Option": The Possible Impact of NATO Planning for an Invasion
The "Ground Option": The Role of the KLA
Detailed Lessons and Issues of the Air and Missile Campaign
Beyond Air and Missile Power: The Ground Phase of Kosovo, Nation-Building, and Continuing Instability in the Balkans