Willkommen, schön sind Sie da!
Logo Ex Libris

Rationality in Extensive Form Games

  • Kartonierter Einband
  • 252 Seiten
(0) Erste Bewertung abgeben
Bewertungen
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
Alle Bewertungen ansehen
I would like to use this preface to thank some persons and institutions which have been important during the various stages of wri... Weiterlesen
CHF 197.00
Print on Demand - Auslieferung erfolgt in der Regel innert 4 bis 6 Wochen.
Bestellung & Lieferung in eine Filiale möglich

Beschreibung

I would like to use this preface to thank some persons and institutions which have been important during the various stages of writing this book. First of all, I am grateful to Kluwer Academic Publishers for giving me the opportunity to write this book. I started writing the book in 1998 while I was working at the Departament d'Economia i d'Historia Economica at Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, and continued the writing job from september 1998 to september 2000 at the Departamento de Economfa at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. The book has been completed while I was visiting the Department of Quantitative Economics at the University of Maastricht from october 2000 to august 2001. I wish to thank these three departments for their hospitality. The book has improved substantially by comments and critique from the following persons who have read parts of the manuscript: Geir Asheim, Eric van Damme, Janos Flesch, Mari-Angeles de Frutos, Diego Moreno, Hans Peters, Antonio Romero and Dries Vermeulen. I should also mention my discussions with Peter Wakker about the decision-theoretic foundations of noncooperative game theory, which have had an important impact on various parts of the book. Finally, I wish to express my warmest gratitude to my parents, my brother and my sister, and, last but not least, to Cati, to whom I dedicate this book.

Autorentext
Andrés Perea completed his Ph.D. in 1997 at Maastricht University, The Netherlands. From 1997 to 1998 he worked as a visiting professor at Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona. In addition, from 1998 to 2000, Andrés worked at Universidad Carlos III as a visiting professor, and from 2000 on as an associate professor.

Klappentext

This book is concerned with situations in which several persons reach decisions independently and the final consequence depends, potentially, upon each of the decisions taken. Such situations may be described formally by an extensive form game: a mathematical object which specifies the order in which decisions are to be taken, the information available to the decision makers at each point in time, and the consequence that results for each possible combination of decisions. A necessary requirement for rational behavior in such games is that each decision maker should reach a decision that is optimal, given his preferences over his own decisions. This requirement is far from sufficient, however, since every decision maker should in addition base his preferences upon the conjecture that his opponents will act optimally as well. It is this principle that distinguishes noncooperative game theory from one-person decision theory. The main purpose of Rationality in Extensive Form Games is to discuss different formalizations of this principle in extensive form games, such as backward induction, Nash equilibrium, forward induction and rationalizability, under the assumption that the decision makers' preferences are given by subjective expected utility functions. The various formalizations, or rationality criteria, are illustrated by examples, and the relationships among the different criteria are explored.



Inhalt
Preface. 1. Introduction. 2. Extensive Form Games. 3. Backward Induction and Nash Equilibrium. 4. Consistency and Sequential Rationality. 5. Forward Induction. 6. Transformations of Games. 7. Rationalizability. Bibliography. Index.

Produktinformationen

Titel: Rationality in Extensive Form Games
Autor:
EAN: 9781441949189
ISBN: 1441949186
Format: Kartonierter Einband
Herausgeber: Springer US
Genre: Volkswirtschaft
Anzahl Seiten: 252
Gewicht: 388g
Größe: H235mm x B155mm x T13mm
Jahr: 2010
Auflage: 2001

Weitere Produkte aus der Reihe "Theory and Decision Library C"