Economic sanctions: panacea, symbolic but ineffectual, or useless and counterproductive? While these questions have framed much the existing debate, Drury digs deeper to why foreign policy leaders, and especially the president, choose sanctions, of which type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. Skilfully integrating domestic and international factors, and placing the analysis of sanctions directly into the mainstream of strategic studies and decision theory, this book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of databases.

'With surprising results that often come from actually testing a set of both theoretically derived and 'conventional wisdom' propositions, Professor Drury's rigorous analysis sets a new, higher standard in the study of economic coercion. Definitively laying to rest some questions, refining others, and posing new ones, Professor Drury's findings will serve as the platform for the next generation of research on why, when, and how the U.S. government employs economic sanctions to achieve its goals in foreign policy as well as foreign economic policy an important distinction it turns out. Given the renaissance of interest in alternatives to military force, this book is not only important but also timely.'

• Richard S. Olson, Professor of Political Science, Florida International University

"Cooper Drury has managed to unearth new ways of thinking about sanctions, contributing to a wide-ranging and important debate. By focusing on the understudied area of presidential decision-making on sanctions, he increases understanding of why they continue to be so frequently used in the face of conventional wisdom that they 'never work.'"

• Kimberly Elliott, co-author of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered

  Autorentext
  A. COOPER DRURY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri, USA.

  Inhalt
  Introduction The Conventional Wisdom International/Dyadic Reasons to Sanction Domestic Political Reasons to Sanction Presidential Rationality and the Decision to Sanction Analysis of the Decision to Initiate an Economic Sanction Analysis of the Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy Assessment of a Target-Selection Bias Selecting the Severity of the Sanction Used Conclusions and Implications