The value of many goods and many social and legal norms and institutions is correlated to the number of people who adopt them, in other words: They exhibit network effects. But while harmonization enhances network benefits, it also diminishes the benefits derived from variety.

In the first part of his study, Volker Simmering introduces an evolutionary game theoretic model in order to investigate how globalization influences the evolution of international standards and he compares the roles of mandatory and voluntary standards. The second part is devoted to the problem of technological progress in networks, and the third one analyzes the resolution of conflicts within international standardization bodies. As a result, he suggests that policy intervention and the presence of adjacent institutional arrangements are likely to improve the performance of network markets, e.g. those for information technology and telecommunication. Since standardization is difficult to enforce its design is, however, not a trivial challenge.

Autorentext

Dr. Volker Simmering promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Manfred J. Holler am Graduiertenkolleg "Recht und Ökonomik" der Universität Hamburg.

Klappentext

Volker Simmering shows how globalization influences the evolution of international standards and compares the roles of mandatory and voluntary standards. He investigates the problem of technological progress in networks and analyzes the resolution of conflicts within international standardization bodies. As a result, he suggests that policy intervention and the presence of adjacent institutional arrangements are likely to improve the performance of network markets, e.g. those for information technology and telecommunication.

Inhalt

Economics of networks, compatibility and standardization Evolutionary approach to network effects and globalization Mandatory and/or voluntary standards Impact of users' commitment on the technological progress in network industries Voting on harmonization