Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth

This book has two objectives: to be a contribution to the understanding of Frege's theory of truth - especially a defence of his notorious critique of the correspondence theory - and to be an introduction to the practice of interpreting philosophical texts.

Autorentext
ULRICH PARDEY is Professor of Philosophy at Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany, and one time Visiting Professor at the University of California, Irvine, USA. He is the author of Identität, Existenz und Reflexivität. Sprachanalytische Untersuchungen zur deskriptiven Metaphysik, (Identity, Existence and Reflexivity. An Analytic Enquiry in Descriptive Metaphysics) and Begriffskonflikte in Logik, Sprache, Metaphysik (Conceptual Dilemmas in Logic, Language and Metaphysics).

Inhalt
Series Editor's Foreword Preface Acknowledgements Texts and Translations List of Logical Symbols Introduction: In Tarski's Shadow The Context: The Question of Truth Bearers Frege's Text and Its Argumentative Structure The First Argument: Scientific Truth is Absolute The Second Argument: Scientific Truth is Perfect The Third Argument: Scientific Truth is Independent Parallels in Frege's 'Logik' The Fourth Argument: The Circle Objection The Omnipresence of Truth Dummett's Regress The Reduction of I-Truth to S-Truth The Fifth Argument: Frege's Regress The Road to a Novel Interpretation Absolute or Relative Truth? Tarski's Definition of Truth and Frege's Critique Conclusion I: Absolute versus Relative Truth Conclusion II: Two Ways of Interpretation Appendix: Synopsis of Relevant Frege Passages and Their Various Translations Notes Bibliography Index