This volume features more than fifteen essays written in honor of Peter D. Klein. It explores the work and legacy of this prominent philosopher, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology.The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein's work. They engage directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors. In addition, a comprehensive introduction discusses the overall impact of Klein's philosophical work. It also explains how each of the essays in the book fits within that legacy. Coverage includes such topics as a knowledge-first account of defeasible reasoning, felicitous falsehoods, the possibility of foundationalist justification, the many formal faces of defeat, radical scepticism, and more.

Overall, the book provides readers with an overview of Klein's contributions to epistemology, his importance to twentieth and twenty-first-century philosophy, and a survey of his philosophical ideas and accomplishments. It's not only a celebration of the work of an important philosopher. It also offers readers an insightful journey into the nature of knowledge, scepticism, and justification.

Autorentext
Branden Fitelson is Distinguished Philosophy at Northeastern University.Rodrigo Borges is an Assistant Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul.Cherie Braden is a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

Inhalt

Part I: Knowledge.- Chapter 1. Reflective Knowledge (Ernest Sosa).- Chapter 2. Epistemically Useful Falsehoods (Catherine Z. Elgin).- Chapter 3. Theoretical Unity in Epistemology (Jonathan L. Kvanvig).- Chapter 4. Accurate Enough, Comprehensive Enough, and Reasonable Enough Belief (Richard Foley).- Chapter 5. Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary (Rodrigo Borges).- Chapter 6. A Causal Aspect of Epistemic Basing (Robert K. Shope).- Part II: Scepticism.- Chapter 7. The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism (Linda Zagzebski).- Chapter 8. Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism (Sharon Ryan).- Chapter 9. Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination (Claudio de Almeida).- Part III: Justification.- Chapter 10. Finite Minds (Michael Huemer).- Chapter 11. Finite Minds and Open Minds (Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson).- Chapter 12. Some Notes on the Possibility of Foundationalist Justification (Sanford C. Goldberg).- Chapter 13. A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat (Matthew Kotzen).- Chapter 14: Benign Infinity (Matthias Steup).