This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly complex political systems such as the European Union. Whilst a number of conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges need to be addressed, the authors show that the principal-agent model can still provide deeper insights into a wide range of political phenomena. Through an empirical analysis of multiple principal-agent relations in the EU, covering a variety of policy fields and political actors, the volume refines our theoretical understanding of the politics of delegation and discretion in the EU. It will appeal to scholars in interested in EU politics and policy, public administration and governance, and international organisations.

The chapter 'Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent's discretion in trade negotiations' is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license via link.springer.com.

Autorentext

Tom Delreux is Professor of EU Politics at the Institut de Sciences Politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE) at the University of Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve), Belgium.

Johan Adriaensen is Research Coordinator at the Center for European Research in Maastricht (CERiM) at Maastricht University, the Netherlands.

Inhalt
Preface - Mark Pollack.- 1. Introduction - Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen*.-* 2. The principal-agent model, accountability and democratic legitimacy - Gijs Jan Brandsma and Johan Adriaensen*.-* 3. Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service - Hylke Dijkstra.- 4. Direct and indirect control on the Council by the European Council - Daniella Kroll*.-* 5. Effects of contestation within a collective agent in EU trade policy-making - Markus Gastinger*.-* 6. Agent interaction as a source of discretion for the High Representative - Niklas Helwig.- 7. Impact of the agent's environment on discretion in the field of EU conflict resolution - Arne Niemann and Friedrich Planck*.-* 8. Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent's discretion in trade negotiations - Eugenia da Conceicão-Heldt*.-* 9. Agents as information asymmetry managers in EU trade policy-making - Evelyn Coremans and Bart Kerremans*.-* 10. Process-tracing as a tool to analyse discretion - Yf Reekers and Derek Beach*.-* 11. Conclusions - Johan Adriaensen and Tom Delreux.- Index.