This book sets out and examines the comprehensive theory of value advanced by G.W. Leibniz over the mature period of his career. Well-known as a mathematician, a physical scientist, a metaphysician, a theologian, and even as an engineer and inventor, he is less known as a moral theorist, or even as championing a theory of value at all. And yet he does. Unfortunately, like much of Leibniz's philosophical thought, his ideas on the nature, scope, and practice of morality are scattered throughout precious few books, various but numerous essays, aphoristic lists, abandoned (and so partial) projects, and volumes of correspondence. While no one text represents his considered view, a focused study of his output provides ample evidence that his favored moral theory, one that he tends to develop in subtle ways consistent with his systematic metaphysics, is a version of what we today think of as scholastic eudaimonism, i.e., the view that the ultimate goal of human life is happiness or flourishing in accord with human nature, happiness or flourishing that is achieved primarily by virtuous character and virtuous activity. This is the first text to offer a (fairly) exhaustive overview of Leibniz's moral theory in several decades. The book also aims to integrate to some extent Leibniz's positions on moral psychology, metaphysics, ethics, and even Christian theology, demonstrating the ways in which they come together (or, as the case may be, exist in tension).

Autorentext

T. Allan Hillman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Alabama, USA. His published research focuses primarily on the medieval and early modern periods of European philosophy.