This volume translates Brentano's intentionality into medieval psychological and ontological discussions through Sadrian theories of sense perception and mental existence. Applying a new methodology, it reframes various parts of Sadrian theory around the problem of intentionality, which results in a refreshed reading of the philosopher Mulla Sadra. The book starts out by defining intentionality problem and discussing the historiography of Brentano's conceptualization. It examines immateriality, content and aboutness, and sense perception. In its conclusion, the book claims that intentionality in Mulla Sadra combines ontological and psychological realities and that as a result of Sadrian monism, the intentionality, intentional object, the agent, and the reality are different versions of same reality.

Autorentext

Sümeyye Parildar was born in Ankara in 1980. After her BA in Marmara University Theology Faculty, she completed her first MA in Islamic Philosophy in the same university. Her second MA is in Philosophy in Birmingham University. She received her PhD in Exeter University with the dissertation titled 'Intentionality in Mulla Sadra' in 2014. She is a lecturer in Istanbul University since 2015.

Inhalt

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Include:1.1 What is the Philosophical Problem of Intentionality? 1.2 Constructing the Intentionality Problem: Brentano and His Historiography 1.3 What was Brentano's Project?

Chapter 2.INTENTIONALITY AS IMMATERIALITY

Include:2.1 Brentano and his description of Intentionality as mark of the mental: The Soul and Its Immateriality 2.2 De Anima and Definition of the Soul 2.3 Soul and Its Immateriality in Mulla Sadra

Chapter 3.INTENTIONAL OBJECTS

Include: 3.1 What is an Intentional Object? a. Meaning and Introduction of a Theory of Objects b. Reductionist Answers to the Problem of Intentional Objects: Russell and Quine 3.2 Quest for a Different Frame to the Problem of Intentionality: Mental Existence a. Existence as a Concept b. Existence as Predicate c. Non-existence d. Universals as Mental Existence e. Quiddity as Mental Existence

Chapter 4. SENSE PERCEPTION AS INTENTIONAL

Include: 4.1 Sense Theory in Aristotle and Avicenna 4.2 Sense Theory in Mulla Sadra 4.3 External Senses 4.4 Internal Senses Chapter 5. Conclusion: ontology of intentionality and primacy of existence

Include: 5.1 Is Intentionality Action or Content? 5.2 Primacy of Existence