This book explores the methodological strategies for linking philosophy and neuroscience concerning the study of the conscious brain. The author focuses on four distinct methods for relating these two academic disciplines: isolationist, reductionist, neurophenomenological, and non-reductionist. After analyzing the pros and cons of these approaches, Steven S. Gouveia applies them to the concept of Qualia and Information to understand how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each approach influence the definitions of those specific concepts. Gouveia argues for an approach that conceives the interdisciplinarity of both philosophy and neuroscience, in a particular and sound methodology, offering empirical examples of the explanatory power of this methodology over the others. Additionally, he shows how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each methodology-usually taken by researchers implicitly and unconsciously-influence their own approach to the methodological problem.

Steven S. Gouveia is a Post Doctoral Research Fellow at the Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics Unit of the Royal Institute of Mental Health, University of Ottawa, Canada.

Autorentext

Steven S. Gouveia is a Post Doctoral Research Fellow at the Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics Unit of the Royal Institute of Mental Health, University of Ottawa, Canada.

Inhalt

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I - METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE I.1. General Introduction

I.2. Metaphilosophy: Introduction and Analysis

I.3. The Philosophy of Neuroscience: Introduction and Analysis

I.3.1. Nature and Structure of Neuroscience I.3.2. Neuroscience Concepts, Principles and Methods

I.3.3. Traditional Issues of Philosophy and Neuroscience

I.3.4. Philosophy of Neuroscience, Relationship with Other Areas of

Philosophy and new Areas of Research

I.4. Brief Introduction to Neuroscience

CHAPTER II - METHODOLOGICAL ISOLATIONISM

I.1. Isolationist Approach

I.1.1 Concepts Anticipate Facts

I.1.2. Wittgenstein's Influence I.1.3. Example of an Isolationist Investigation: Determinism

I.1.4. Several defenses of the Isolationist Approach

II.2. Critical Reflection

II.2.1. The "Conceptual Invariance" Objection

II.2.2. Dennett's Objection

II.2.3. Searle's Objection

II.2.4. The Objection of "Philosophical Practice and Anti-Exceptionality"

III.3. Conclusion

CHAPTER III - REDUCTIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHY

I.1. Assumptions of the Reductive Approach

I.1.1. Denial of Dualism

I.1.2. The Concept of Reductionism

I.1.2.1. Reduction as Translation (RcT)

I.1.2.2. Reduction as Derivation (RcD)

I.1.2.3. Reduction as Explanation (RcE)

I.1.3. Reduction in Patricia Churchland

I.1.4. Folk Psychology Theory

I.1.5. Reduction in John Bickle

I.1.6. The Interteorethical Reduction Theory

I.2. Critical Reflection

II.2.1. The "Non-Theory" Objection

II.2.2. The "Multiple Realizability" Objection

II.2.3. The "Ontological Reduction" Objection

II.2.4. The "Methodological Isolation" Objection

II.2.5. The "Metaphilosophical" Objection

III.3. Conclusion

CHAPTER IV - NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY

I.1. Assumptions of the Neurophenomenology Approach

I.1.1. Phenomenology

I.1.2. The Importance of the Body and Criticism of the Brain

I.1.3. The 4E's and Francisco Varela's Neurophenomenological Approach

I.1.4. An example of Neurophenomenological Research: the case of

Binocular Rivalry

I.1.5. An example of Neurophenomenological Research: the Self in Evan

Thompson

I.1.6. Three Pragmatic Lessons for a Rigorous Neurophenomenology

I.1.6.1. Science's Reformulation

I.1.6.2. Better Science

I.1.6.3. The Focus on the Interviewer

II.2. Critical Reflection

II.2.1. The "Explanatory Gap" Objection

II.2.2. The "Introspection" Objection II.2.3. The "Reductionist Accusation" Objection

II.2.4. The Objection of "Inconclusive Metaphilosophy"

III.3. Conclusion CHAPTER V - NON-REDUCTIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHY

I.1. Assumptions of the Non-Reductive Approach

I.1.1. Methodological Balance

I.1.2. Methodological Strategies

I.1.2.1. The Asymmetry Principle

I.1.2.2. The Bidirectionality principle

I.1.2.3. The Principle of Transdisciplinary Circularity

I.1.3. The Nature and Metaphilosophy of the Neurophilosophical

Hypothesis

I.1.3.1. Brain Based (and not reduced) Perspective

I.1.3.2. First-Person Neuroscience

I.1.4.1. Example of Investigation of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy: the

case of the Self

I.1.4.2. Example of Investigation of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy: the

Self and COVID-19

I.1.4.3. Example of Investigation of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy: the

case of Emotions

II.2. Critical Reflection

II.2.1. Objection of the "Category Mistake"

II.2.2. Objection of "Methodological Irrelevance"

II.2.3. Objection of "Inaccurate Metaphilosophy"

III.3. Conclusion

CHAPTER VI - QUALIA AND INFORMATION IN PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE

I.1. Concept of "Qualia"

I.1.1. The Isolationist Approach and Qualia

I.1.2. The Reductive Approach and Qualia

I.1.3. The Neurophenomenology Approach and Qualia

I.1.4. The Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy Approach and Qualia

II.2. Concept of "Information" and the Different Approaches

III.3. Conclusion CONCLUSION