Facility location theory develops the idea of locating one or more facilities by optimizing suitable criteria such as minimizing transportation cost, or capturing the largest market share. The contributions in this book focus an approach to facility location theory through game theoretical tools highlighting situations where a location decision is faced by several decision makers and leading to a game theoretical framework in non-cooperative and cooperative methods. Models and methods regarding the facility location via game theory are explored and applications are illustrated through economics, engineering, and physics. Mathematicians, engineers, economists and computer scientists working in theory, applications and computational aspects of facility location problems using game theory will find this book useful.

Inhalt

Bilevel Models on the Competitive Facility Location Problem (N. Aras and H. Küçükaydn).- Partial Cooperation in Location Choice: Salop's Model with Three Firms (S. Chakrabarti and R. Gilles).- A Class of Location Games with Type Dependent Facilities (I. Curiel).- Location methods and Nash equilibria for experimental design in astrophysics and aerospace engineering (E. Daniele, P. De Paolis, G. Luca Greco, A. d'Argenio).- Leader-Follower Models in Facility Location (T. Drezner and Z. Drezner).- Asymmetries in Competitive Location Models on the Line(H.A. Eiselt, V. Marianov).- Huff-like Stackelberg Location Problems on the Plane (J. Fernández, J. Redondo, P. Ortigosa and B.- Tóth).- A Game Theoretic Approach to an Emergency Units Location Problem (V. Fragnelli, S. Gagliardo and F. Gastaldi).- An Equilibrium-Econometric Analysis of Rental Housing Markets with Indivisibilities (M. Kaneko and T. Ito).- Large Spatial Competition (M. Núez and Marco Scarsini).- FacilityLocation Situations and Related Games in Cooperation(O. Palanc and S.Z. Alparslan Gök).- Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs: A Three-Firm Case (S. Patrí and A. Sacco).- Nash equilibria in network facility location under delivered prices (B. Pelegrín, P. Fernández and M.D. García).- Sharing costs in some distinguished location problems (J. Puerto).