This book systematically explores the relationship between party funding and corruption, and addresses fundamental concerns in the continued consideration of how democracy should function. The book analyses whether parties funded primarily through private donations are necessarily more corrupt than those funded by the state, and whether different types of corruption are evident in different funding regimes. Drawing on a comparison of Great Britain and Denmark, the author argues that levels of state subsidy are, in fact, unrelated to the type of corruption found. Subsidies are not a cure for corruption or, importantly, perceived corruption, so if they are to be introduced or sustained, this should be done for other reasons. Subsidies can, for example, be justified on grounds of public utility. Meanwhile, anti-corruption measures should focus on other regulations, but even then we should not expect such measures to impact on perceptions of corruption in the short term. Sam Power is Lecturer in Corruption Analysis at the University of Sussex, UK. Previously he was Associate Lecturer in Politics at the University of Exeter and Research Associate at the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, University of Sheffield. Sam has written extensively on issues related to the financing of politics in both academic and non-academic publications and regularly provides expert interviews and analyses on TV, on the radio, and online.

Autorentext
Sam Power is Lecturer in Corruption Analysis at the University of Sussex, UK. Previously he was Associate Lecturer in Politics at the University of Exeter and Research Associate at the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, University of Sheffield. Sam has written extensively on issues related to the financing of politics in both academic and non-academic publications and regularly provides expert interviews and analyses on TV, on the radio, and online.

Inhalt

1. Introduction: party funding and corruption in advanced industrial democracies2. The relationship between corruption and the funding of party competition3. New institutionalism: towards a consolidated approach4. Analysing corruption and party funding5. Great Britain and Denmark: party funding regimes and party accounts6. The institutional evolution of the party funding regime in Great Britain7. Party funding and corruption in Great Britain8. The institutional evolution of the Danish party funding regime9. Party funding and corruption in Denmark10. Conclusion: money, power and representationReferences