This book argues that postwar Britain's 'imperial over-extension' has been exaggerated. Britain developed and adjusted its defence strategy based upon the perceived Communist threat and available resources. It was especially successful at adapting to meet the strategic and resource challenges from the Far East from 1947-54. There British and Gurkha forces were deployed only in contingencies that threatened vital British interests, while the U.S. and Commonwealth allies were persuaded to accept key wartime missions, thus preserving Britain's ability to fight in Western Europe.

Autorentext

RAFFI GREGORIAN is Senior Advisor on Balkans issues in the State Department's Office of Kosovo and Dayton Implementation.

Inhalt

List of Tables List of Figures Preface Acknowledgements Glossary Introduction 'Future Defence Policy': The Far East as Strategic Backwater, 1945-1948 National Service, the Gurkhas, and the Reorganization of the British Army, 1946-1948 FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1950 'To the Last Round': The Defence of Hong Kong, 1948-1950 Adapting to Reality: The Far East and Cold War Strategy, 1950-1954 Between the American Scylla and Chinese Charybdis: Hong Kong, 1950-1954 Manpower, the Strategic Reserve, and the Malayan Emergency, 1950-1954 Siam and the Commonwealth Defence of Malaya Limited Liability and the Defence of Southeast Asia, 1950-1954 Conclusion Selected Bibliography Index