For twenty-five years, the International Monetary Fund administered a worldwide system of fixed exchange rates until their system was destroyed by a combination of market forces and those who advocated market forces. The first destructive element has been extensively analyzed; the second has hitherto been almost completely ignored. Robert Leeson examines the process by which the case for flexible exchange rates was transformed from an academic exercise to become the organizing principle for international monetary relations.

Autorentext

ROBERT LEESON is currently ranked 17th in the list of the world's top 500 economists on the basis of the number of journal articles included in the ECONLIT database of the American Economic Association. A Bradley Fellow at the University of Ontario, he has also held visiting positions at a variety of universities, including Cambridge and Stanford.

Inhalt

Introduction PART ONE: THE INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK The Combatants Full Employment, Free Trade and Fixed Exchange Rates Friedman's Case for Flexible Exchange Rates The Bretton Woods Establishment PART TWO: THE ACADEMIC PROCESS: FROM THE 1940s-1968 The Early History of the Case for Floating Exchange Rates An Emerging Academic Consensus 1966: Four Conferences 1967: The AEA President Versus the AFA President PART THREE: THE POLICY PROCESS: 1968-1971 From Academia to Washington Flexible Exchange Rates as a Vehicle for Nixon's re-election The Cross of Gold PART FOUR: FRIEDMAN AND THE POLICY REVOLUTION The Nature and Origins of Friedman's Influence Intellectuals US Senators The International Policemen US Treasury Secretaries Chairmen of the Federal Reserve System Within the White House PART FIVE: END GAME Secretary Schultz Secretary Simon Conclusion