Despite their shared underlying interests, Britain and France, the only powers in a position to effectively meet the first overt challenges to the European order established after 1918, ignominiously failed in the management of the crises facing them in Ethiopia and the Rhineland. In this book the author attempts to understand the (mal)functioning of the Anglo-French relationship at this key juncture on the path to the second world war.

Autorentext

RICHARD DAVIS is the Maître de Conferences at the University of Lille, France where he teaches Contemporary British History. He is author of several articles on Anglo-French relations in the twentieth century.

Inhalt

Preface Acknowledgements INTRODUCTION The Anglo-French Community of Interest THE ETHIOPIAN CRISIS The Ethiopian Test Case Mussolini Decides on War First Attempts to Buy Off Italy The Double-Line All Sanctions Short of War The Decisive Phase The Collapse of the Hoare-Laval Plan The Crisis Resolved THE RHINELAND CRISIS Britain, France and the German Problem Anglo-French Expectations Mutual Considerations and Doubts The Storm Breaks Discussions and Bargaining The Crisis Passes By CONCLUSION The Failure of the Anglo-French Alliance Notes Bibliography Index