This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account of scientific practice and of its impressive achievements, and defuses the main motivations for scientific realism. More generally, Modal Empiricism purports to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science. This book is of interest to any philosopher involved in the debate on scientific realism, or interested in how to properly understand the content, aim and achievements of science.

Autorentext
Quentin Ruyant is currently a post-doctoral fellow in Philosophy of Science at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy of Science at UCLouvain / Université de Rennes 1. He has been working on scientific realism, structural realism and empiricism, and is currently doing research on the role of modalities in scientific representation.

Inhalt

1. The Debates on Scientific Realism2. Theories, Models and Representation3. Contextual Use and Communal Norms4. Modal Empirical Adequacy5. Situated Possibilities, Induction and Necessity6. Scientific Success7. Theory Change8. Semantic Pragmatism