This book offers a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that seeks to clarify why certain experiences are a source of immediate justification and what role experiences play in gaining (scientific) knowledge. Based on the author's account of experiential justification, this book exemplifies how a phenomenological experience-first epistemology can epistemically ground the individual sciences. More precisely, it delivers a comprehensive picture of how we get from epistemology to the foundations of mathematics and physics. The book is unique as it utilizes methods and insights from the phenomenological tradition in order to make progress in current analytic epistemology. It serves as a starting point for re-evaluating the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to current analytic epistemology and making an important step towards paving the way for future mutually beneficial discussions. This is achieved by exemplifying how current debates can benefit from ideas, insights, and methods we find in the phenomenological tradition.

Autorentext
Dr. Philip Berghofer is a Post-Doc researcher and lecturer at the Philosophy Department of the University of Graz, Austria. His research focus centers around epistemology, phenomenology, philosophy of physics, and philosophy of mathematics. His current position is funded by the research project Intentionality and Symbolic Construction: The Phenomenological Background of Hermann Weyl's Philosophy of Physics granted by the Austrian Science Fund. Prior to this, he was a recipient of a DOC-Fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.
Dr. Berghofer is the designated president of the Austrian Society of Phenomenology, designated Book Review Editor of Husserl Studies (Springer), and the co-editor of the volume Phenomenological Approaches to Physics (Synthese Library, 2020).

Inhalt
Introduction
Part I. A Phenomenological Conception of Experiential Justification1. Motivating PCEJ2. Perceptual Justification3. Intuitional Justification4. How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: Phenomenological Principles are the Fundamental Epistemological Principles!
Part II. Husserl as a Proponent of PCEJ5. Husserl as a Moderate Foundationalist6. The Nature and Systematic Role of Evidence: Husserl as a Proponent of Mentalist Evidentialism7. Husserl's Conception of Experiential Justification8. Husserl's Universal Empiricism as a Moderate Rationalism9. Husserl's Phenomenological Intuitionism
Part III. Transcendental Phenomenology as the Ultimate Science10. Transcendental Phenomenology as an Epistemological Project11. New Ways to Transcendental Phenomenology12. Transcendental Phenomenology as the Project of Ultimate Elucidation
Part IV. The Phenomenological Foundations of the Individual Sciences13. Sources of Knowledge: The Correlational A Priori14. The Phenomenological Foundations of Mathematics: Introducing a Phenomenological Intuitionism15. Phenomenological Approaches to Physics
ConclusionIndex