Kawalec's monograph is a novel defence of the programme of inductive logic, developed initially by Rudolf Carnap in the 1950s and Jaakko Hintikka in the 1960s. It revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The main strength of the work is its link between inductive logic and contemporary discussions of epistemology. Through this perspective the author succeeds to shed new light on the significance of inductive logic. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. The claim is made that this sets up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems. Kawalec writes in a clear manner, makes his theses and arguments explicit, and gives ample bibliographical references.

Inhalt

Preface. Acknowledgements. 1: The Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.1. The Main Ideas Preceding the Construction of the Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.2. Carnap's Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.3. The Finnish School's Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.4. The Bayesian Developments of Inductive Logic. 2: Inductive Logic as a Structural Reliabilist Theory of Justification. 2.1. The Mentalist Theory of Justification and Process Reliabilism. 2.2.Conflicting Meta-Level Assumptions of Mentalistic Reliabilist Theories of Justification. 2.3. The Minimalist Theory of Justification and Structural Reliabilism. 2.4. Carnap's Structural Reliabilism. 2.5. The Finnish School's Systems of Inductive Logic and Structural Reliabilism. 3: Structural Reliabilism and the Problems of Bayesian Epistemology. 3.1. Epistemological Criticisms of Carnap's Inductive Logic. 3.2. Structural Reliabilism and Difficulties of Mentalistic Reliabilism. 3.3. Structural Reliabilism and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. 3.4.The Structural Reliabilist Redefinition of the Bayesian Objective-Subjective Dichotomy. Conclusion. References. Index.