Action is conceived of as an intentional behavior of an individual or of an institutional subject; it is determined by information processing, namely by a process in which pieces of descriptive and practical information are involved. Action is explained by a formal and finalistic theory which is connected with a specific theory of institutions. The philosophical basis of the logic of norm sentences and of other systems of practical thinking (formal teleology, axiology, logic of preferences) is discussed. The author criticizes traditional deontic logic and argues in favor of a genuine logic of norms. The book gives a structure analysis of the so-called practical inference and of nomic causal propositions. Besides a critical account of von Wright's practical philosophy the author offers critical analyses of discourse rationality (Habermas, Apel, Alexy) and of Wittgenstein's views on philosophizing.
The book addresses readers interested in philosophical logic, practical philosophy, sociology of institutions, legal philosophy, and theory democracy.

Inhalt

Foreword. 1. The Nature of Logic and the Concept of the Logic of Norms. 2. Once More: Is and Ought. 3. Practical Rationality. 4. Design of an Alternative Action Theory. 5. Fundamental Concepts and Theses of the Formal-Finalistic Action Theory. 6. On the Idea of Practical Inference. Simultaneously a Study on the Relationship Between Mental Operations and Actions. 7. From Deontic Logic to the Genuine Logic of Norms. 8. Is Willing Liberum Arbitrium? 9. Action and Institution. 10. The Democracy Problem from a Neo-Institutionalistic Point of View. Appendix: Homage to Georg Henrik von Wright. Index of Proper Names. Index of Subjects.