This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle was made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC.

Autorentext

OLIVER BANGE has taught and researched at the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, Aachen, and the London School of Economics, where he took his doctorate. He has published articles and book chapters on European politics, as well as numerous review articles.

Inhalt

General Editor's Foreword Introduction PART I: GRAND DESIGNS AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE FIRST BRITISH EEC NEGOTIATIONS, 1960-63 Fundamental Questions Macmillan's Grand Design (1959/60) as a Starting Point for the Application The Main Obstacle: de Gaulle Quid-pro-Quo Deal? Differing American Ideas Kennedy's Rethinking: the American Offer Adenauer Takes his Stand PART II: THE STORY OF ADENAUER'S AND DE GAULLE'S 'COMPROMISE': A FRESH LOOK AT THE CRITICAL EVENTS OF JANUARY 1963 Nassau, a New Look at its Meaning and its Promotion Heath and the Atlanticists - Heath's 'Big Push' Before the Veto de Gaulle's Infamous Press Conference The Ministerial Meeting - A First Dramatic Encounter Anglo-American Co-ordination Towards a Breakdown in Brussels Adenauer's and de Gaulle's Plan for a Compromise Hysteria in the Western Camp: the Days Between 22 and 28 January, 1963 The Breakdown in Brussels - Purely the Fault of the French? Conclusion Index