A collection of original, state-of-the-art essays by some of the best young philosophers working on the myriad problems of action and agency. Each one has already made important contributions to the philosophy of action and cognate areas. The chapters reflect their research and make a significant contribution to some debate in the field.

Autorentext
TIM BAYNE is University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Mind at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of St. Catherine's College, UK LISA BORTOLOTTI is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham, UK SARA RACHEL CHANT is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri-Columbia, USA NEIL LEVY is Director of Research at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics and Head of Neuroethics at the Florey Neuroscience Institutes, Melbourne, Australia DYLAN MURRAY is a Brains and Behavior Fellow in the Philosophy Department and the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University, USA EDDY NAHMIAS is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University, USA THOMAS NADELHOFFER is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Dickinson College, USA BILL POLLARD is an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Edinburgh, UK CAROLINA SARTORIO is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona, USA MARKUS SCHLOSSER is a Research Fellow at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands YONATAN SHEMMER is a Lecturer of Philosophy at The University of Sheffield, UK MATTHEW SOTERIOU is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Warwick, UK MANUEL VARGAS is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Francisco, USA

Inhalt
Series Editors' Preface Acknowledgements Notes on Contributors Introduction PART I: FOUNDATIONS OF ACTION AND AGENCY Agency, Ownership, and the Standard Theory; M.E.Schlosser Failing to do the Impossible; C.Sartorio Experimental Philosophy of Action; T.Nadelhoffer PART II: AUTONOMY Identification, Psychology, and Habits; B.Pollard Mass Perverse Identification: An Argument for a Modest Concept of Autonomy; Y.Shemmer Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental; M.Soteriou PART III: FREE AGENCY The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will; M.Vargas Luck and Free Will; N.Levy Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions; E.Nahmias & D.Murray PART IV: ACTION AND AGENCY IN CONTEXT Agentive Experiences as Pushmi-Pullyu Representations; T.Bayne Double Bookkeeping in Delusions: Explaining the Gap Between Saying and Doing; L.Bortolotti The Limits of Rationality in Collective Action Explanations; S.R.Chant Index