Examines international cooperation in European security from a transaction cost economics perspective. This book addresses the puzzle of how to approach differing institutional preferences. It argues that the reduction and limitation of transaction costs was the primary determinant of security preferences.

Autorentext
MORITZ WEISS Senior Fellow at the Centre for Security Economics and Technology (C SET) and Lecturer at the Institute of Political Science, University of St Gallen, Switzerland. His articles have appeared in journals including the Journal of International Relations and Development and Cooperation and Conflict.

Inhalt
PART I: PREFERENCES, SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSACTION COSTS IN WORLD POLITICS Introduction Theorising Preference Formation for Institution-Building in European Security Transaction Costs and Security Institutions PART II: UNRAVELLING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (EDSP) The Demand for a Security Institution: German, British and French Perceptions of the Environment in the 1990s Germany - From Defending the Alliance's Territory To Crisis Management for the Union Great Britain - From Opposing the Union towards a Subordinated ESDP France - From Gradual WEU Integration to Full-Scale ESDP Germany: An Incrementally Decreasing Willingness to Bind the Country Great Britain - From No EU Security Policy To a Purely Intergovernmental ESDP France - A Consistently Intergovernmental Approach towards ESDP PART III: TRANSACTION COSTS AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: ESDP UNRAVELLED Alternative Explanations and Theoretical Scope of the Transaction Costs Framework Conclusion - Theory-Development in the European Security and Defence Policy