One of the most basic themes in the philosophy of language is referential uptake, viz., the question of what counts as properly `understanding' a referring act in communication. In this inquiry, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts, and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. Readership: Philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.

Inhalt

Acknowledgements. Conventions. Introduction. 1. Characterizing Referential Communication. 2. Mental States in Referential Communication. 3. Re-Identification in Referential Communication. 4. Accounting for Mental Reference. 5. Traditional Accounts of Success in Referential Communication. 6. Evans' Account of Success in Referential Communication. 7. A New Account of Success in Referential Communication. References. Index.