This book examines how China's decentralization process has affected and will affect the country's macroeconomic performance and the functioning of the market. With an innovative application of game theory, the author develops an analytical framework that can explain the behaviour of the central and local governments under alternative institutional environments. The study also suggests how to establish desirable rules of games in China's political and economic institutions through appropriate reforms.

Autorentext

Jun Ma

Inhalt

List of Tables - List of Figures - Acknowledgements - List of Abbreviations - Introduction - Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Macroeconomic Management - Central Governmental Credibility and Local Tax Efforts: A Game Theoretic Model - Central Government Transfer under Soft Budget Constraint - Intergovernmental Relations and Monetary Management - Central Government Credibility and Monetary Expansion: A Game Theoretic Model - Intergovernmental Relations and Market Development - Bibliography - Index