Groups, Norms and Practices

This edited volume examines the relationship between collective intentionality and inferential theories of meaning. The book consists of three main sections. The first part contains essays demonstrating how researchers working on inferentialism and collective intentionality can learn from one another. The essays in the second part examine the dimensions along which philosophical and empirical research on human reasoning and collective intentionality can benefit from more cross-pollination. The final part consists of essays that offer a closer examination of themes from inferentialism and collective intentionality that arise in the work of Wilfrid Sellars.

Groups, Norms and Practices provides a template for continuing an interdisciplinary program in philosophy and the sciences that aims to deepen our understanding of human rationality, language use, and sociality.

Autorentext
Ladislav Kore is a Vice-Dean for science and research at the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Hradec Králové. His current research focuses on social-normative aspects of human cognition, decision-making and communication. He has published his works in the areas of epistemology, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language and philosophy of psychology.
Hans Bernhard Schmid is a professor for Political and Social Philosophy at the University of Vienna. His research interests include Social Ontology, Phenomenology, and Existential Philosophy.

Preston Stovall is a postdoctoral researcher at the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Hradec Králové. He works on the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and themes in German idealism and American pragmatism.

Leo Townsend in a postdoctoral research at the faculty of philosophy of the University of Vienna. He works predominantly on social epistemology and collective intentionality, and has published papers on the nature of trust, group agency, and collective belief.

Inhalt
Chapter 1. Introduction.- Chapter 2. Rational Golems: Collective Agents as Players in the Reasoning Game (Javier González de Prado Salas).- Chapter 3. Trust and Commitment in Collective Testimony (Leo Townsend).- Chapter 4. Implicit Scorekeeping: A We-Mode Account of Belief and Interpretation (Ronald Loeffler).- Chapter 5. Normative Mindshaping and the Normative Niche (Jaroslav Peregrin).- Chapter 6. Between Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality: The Role of Shared Activities in the Emergence of Human-Specific Cognitive Capacities (Glenda Satne).- Chapter 7. Wherein is Reasoning Social? (Ladislav Kore).- Chapter 8. Making Sense of We-Awareness: Experiences, Affordances, and Practices (Anna Moltchanova).- Chapter 9. Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication (Christopher Gauker).- Chapter 10. Sellars on Rational Agency as Presupposing Collective Attitudes (Jeremy Randel Koons).- Chapter 11. A Model-Theoretic Semantics for Descriptive, Prescriptive, and Intentional Sentences (Preston Stovall).