Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.

Contents

· Insolvency Timing as an Agency Problem

· Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing

· Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision

· Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments

Target Groups

· Researchers and students in the field of business economics with a focus on corporate restructuring and decision theory

· Practitioners in corporate restructuring and insolvency professionals, managers and company owners

TheAuthor

Frederik Drescher holds a degree in Business Administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management and wrote his doctoral thesis at Technische Universität München under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl. He is a consultant with a special focus on corporate restructuring.

Autorentext

Frederik Drescher holds a degree in Business Administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management and wrote his doctoral thesis at Technische Universität München under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl. He is a consultant with a special focus on corporate restructuring.

Inhalt
InInsolvency Timing as an Agency Problem.- Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing.- Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision.- Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments.