Covering the period from 1878-1915, Ottomans and Armenians is a military history of the Ottoman army and the counterinsurgency campaigns it waged in the last days of the Ottoman empire. Although Ottomans were among the most active practitioners of counterinsurgency campaigning in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, in the vast literature available on counterinsurgency in the early twenty-first century, there is very little scholarly analysis of how Ottomans reacted to insurgency and then went about counterinsurgency. This book presents the thesis that the Ottoman government developed an evolving, 35-year, empire-wide array of counterinsurgency practices that varied in scope and execution depending on the strategic importance of the affected provinces.

Autorentext

Edward J. Erickson is Professor of Military History at the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, USA. He retired from the US army as a lieutenant colonel and served in artillery and general staff assignments in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. He is widely recognized as one of the foremost experts on the Ottoman Army during the First World War. Some of his publications include Ordered To Die, A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War; Defeat in Detail, The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913; Ottoman Army Effectiveness in WW1, A Comparative Study; Gallipoli and the Middle East 1914-1918; and Gallipoli, The Ottoman Campaign, and A Military History of the Ottomans, from Osman to Ataturk (co-authored).

Inhalt
Introduction 1. Insurgency by Committee 2. Counterinsurgency in the Empire's Core 3. Counterinsurgency in the Periphery 4. A Template for Destruction 5. Invisible Armies 6. Readiness for War 7. Irregular War in Caucasia and in the Levant 8. Enemies Within 9. A New Course of Action 10. Aftermath