Illegal immigration is a problem to not only a labor importing country but also to a labor exporting country, since the implementation of strict immigration policies, i.e., border patrol and employer sanctions affects both economies. The purpose of this book is to complement previous studies on deportable aliens. The effects of such enforcement policies on the income or welfare of the foreign (labor exporting) country, the home (labor importing) country, and the combined (global) income of the two countries are examined.

Autorentext

CHISATO YOSHIDA is Associate Professor of International Economics at Okayama University, Japan. He obtained his PhD in 1999 from Okayama University and has previously held a position at Okayama University, Japan. His research interests focus on illegal immigration, foreign direct investment and uncertainty.

Inhalt

Introduction.- Part I: The Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration: The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Absence of Capital Mobility; The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility; The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration - No Discernment Case; The Welfare Effects of Border Enforcement on Illegal Immigration.- Part II: The Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration - Financing Problem: The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration; The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration - No Discernment Case.- Part III: The Welfare Effects of a Profit-Sharing Policy: Unemployment, International Migration and Profit-Sharing; International Migration, Profit-Sharing and National Welfare.- Acknowledgements.- Bibliography.- Index.