Development economists and practitioners agree that close collaboration between business and government improves industrial policy, yet little research exists on how best to organize that. This book examines three necessary functions--information exchange, authoritative allocation, and reducing rent seeking--across experiences in Latin America.

Autorentext

Ben Ross Schneider is Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT. He taught previously at Princeton University and Northwestern University. Recent books include Business Politics and the State in 20th Century Latin America and Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America: Business, Labor, and the Challenges of Equitable Development (both with Cambridge University Press).

Inhalt

1. Introduction: Institutional Dynamics of Industrial Policy 2. Principles of Institutional Design in Business-Government Councils I. Introduction II. What happens in Councils: Disaggregating Interactions III. The Korean Model in Export and Technology Councils IV. Conclusion 3. Ongoing Experimentation with Business-Government Councils in Latin America I. Introduction II. Disaggregating Councils by Scope and Function III. Beyond Councils: Formal and Informal Business Representation IV. Conclusions 4. Putting Councils and Industrial Policy in Context: Political Systems and Big Business I. Introduction II. Political Institutions and Privileged Access for Big Business III. Structure and Preferences of Business Groups IV. Business groups, MNCs, and Possibilities for Industrial Policy V. Conclusion 5. Conclusions Appendices A. Interviews B. Abbreviations