Obligation law (contract and tort law) affects incentives and the strategic interaction between the involved parties. Modern economics relies on far developed game theory to capture strategic interaction. Urs Schweizer uses the game-theoretic method to analyze incentives from selected provisions of obligation law.

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Obligation law - both contract and tort - affects incentives and the strategic interaction between the involved parties. Modern economics relies on the highly-developed game theory to capture strategic interaction. In this volume, Urs Schweizer uses the game-theoretic method to analyze incentives from selected provisions of obligation law. Among others, the game-theoretic method leads to important insights in the following areas: quantifying damages under uncertain causation; distorted incentives for taking care due to inefficient negligence standards and to denying damages for certain losses; the effect of reducing damages for contributory negligence; multi-party joint and several liability; excessive incentives for reliance investments under incomplete contracts, and the incentives to search for information prior to sale.

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Autorentext
Geboren 1947; Studium der Mathematik; 1972 Promotion; 1980 Habilitation; seit 1984 Professor für Wirtschaftliche Staatswissenschaften insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Bonn; 1998-2014 Gründungssprecher der BGSE (Bonn Graduate School of Economics).