Lars Klöhn analyzes the "inner system" of the appraisal right of shareholders in a German stock corporation.

In a stock corporation, majority shareholders are allowed to make decisions against the will of the other shareholders. In most cases, minority shareholders have to accept these decisions, in some cases they can exit the corporation against reasonable compensation (§§ 305, 320b, 327a Stock Corporation Act, 29, 122i, 207 Company Transformation Act, §§ 7, 9, 12 Societas Europaea Act, § 39a Takeover Act). Lars Klöhn attempts to analyze the "inner system" of these norms, thus showing and attaining its consistency and its unity. His study is not confined to German stock corporation law but encompasses European law as well as German constitutional law. Its main focus is the dogmatic analysis of the written law, supplemented by a variety of law-and-economics-considerations.

Autorentext
Geboren 1976; Studium der Rechtswissenschaft in Göttingen und Cambridge (USA); derzeit Professor für Bürgerliches Recht, Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht sowie Rechtsvergleichung an der Philipps-Universität Marburg.