Unlike the numerous systematic works dealing with the existence of theoretical entities, which put forward arguments either for or against realism, Karim Bschir uses scientific realism as a basis for a history of the concept of experience in the empiricist philosophy of science.

Philosophy of science in the 20th century was defined by the debate on scientific realism. Unlike the numerous systematic works dealing with the existence of theoretical entities, which put forward arguments either for or against realism, Karim Bschir uses scientific realism as a basis for a history of the concept of experience in the empiricist philosophy of science. He concludes that empiricist approaches are often based on a sensualistic notion of experience, and that the reduction of the concept of experience to that of perception can be seen as a historical contingency.

Autorentext
Geboren 1977; Studium der Biochemie mit Nebenfach Philosophie; 2003 Diplom in Biochemie; seit 2007 wissenschaftlicher Assistent am Lehrstuhl für Philosophie der ETH Zürich; 2010 Promotion in Philosophie; 2009-10 Forschungsaufenthalt am Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) der London School of Economics.