Julia Maria Erber-Schropp shows why the principle of guilt is of fundamental importance to criminal law and that it is unassailable in the free will debate.

The principle of guilt in criminal law - the awarding of personal guilt in judgments to legitimise the punitive sanction - is a much discussed and contested issue within the world of academic law. In the context of the discussion on the question of free will, which is held by some as a prerequisite for criminal responsibility, the issue is also relevant to philosophy. Critics view the principle of guilt as being misleading and ineffective in the legitimation of punishment. They demand the transformation of guilt-based criminal law into a set of sentencing guidelines orientated on the social need to prevent crime. Julia Maria Erber-Schropp shows why the principle of guilt is of fundamental importance to criminal law and that it is unassailable in the free will debate.

Autorentext
Geboren 1978; 1999-2001 Studium der Kulturwissenschaften und Ästhetischen Kommunikation; 2001-06 Studium der Kulturwissenschaft und der Philosophie; 2003-04 Studium der Philosophie und der European Studies; seit 2007 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin der Stiftung Wissen der Sparkasse KölnBonn, seit 2013 Wissenschaftliche Leiterin; 2014 Promotion.