Private interest groups sometimes enjoy, at the initiative of the government, the privilege of controlling the exercise of legislative, executive or judicial powers. Examples are tripartite agreements on laws which are expected to be enacted later on by parliament without any modification. Hans-Georg Dederer examines the specific requirements for such participation of private interest groups in the exercise of governmental power.

Private interest groups (or their representatives) sometimes enjoy, at the initiative of the government, the privilege of controlling (alone or together with the public office holders) the exercise of legislative, executive or judicial powers. Examples are tripartite agreements (between the government, employers' associations and trade unions) on laws which are expected to be enacted later on by parliament without any modification. This phenomenon exists on the European Union level as well, e.g. in the case of the "social dialogue". In the light of democratic principles, particularly the principle of democratic legitimacy, Hans-Georg Dederer examines the specific requirements for such participation of private interest groups in the exercise of governmental power.

Autorentext
ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht, Völkerrecht, Europäisches und Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht an der Universität Passau.