Can human rights be understood as moral rights amenable to a kind of justification capable of convincing the skeptic? If so, can such arguments be derived from the tradition of natural law or be defended by means of the laws of reason? This volume systematically juxtaposes these questions in a bid for reconciliation.

The validity of human rights is today internationally recognised across nations and cultures. The question as to whether and how their validity can be justified is - on the other hand - a bone of contention. Is this based on legal positivism alone? Or can human rights be understood as moral rights amenable to a kind of justification capable of convincing the skeptic? If so, can such arguments be derived from the tradition of natural law or be defended by means of the laws of reason? Does this require anthropological or metaphysical assumptions - or do discourse-theoretical premises suffice? This volume, which specifically latches onto the traditions of legal positivism, natural and rational law, systematically juxtaposes these questions in a bid for reconciliation.

Inhalt
I. Was kann eine Begründung der Menschenrechte leisten?

II. Menschenrechte und positives Recht

III. Menschenrechte und das kantische Vernunftrecht

IV. Menschenrechte im nach-kantischen Vernunftrecht

V. (Neo-)Aristotelische Ansätze zur Menschenrechtsbegründung