Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation

Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain proposes a new legal and institutional framework for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its proposal is designed to remedy the widely acknowledged breakdown of the architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on which we can no longer rely for global nuclear security. First, Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation defines the distinctively dangerous character of contemporary nuclear risk and explains why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty no longer provides a viable foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. It then sets out the reforms needed in order to limit the radical increase in availability, for rogue governments and terrorists, of nuclear weapons related material and technology. Garvey proposes a new counterproliferation architecture, to be built on presently available scientific, legal, and institutional resources, which could achieve a critical reduction of nuclear risk and an expanded deterrence. Guiding principles for establishing this new architecture are formulated, including, most importantly, the principal mechanism for implementation, a United Nations Security Council Counterproliferation Resolution applying equally for all states. This book presents what may be our best opportunity to secure a profoundly more effective global nuclear security and counter the world's current course to a catastrophic nuclear detonation.

Auteur

Jack Garvey is Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where he is Chairman of the International Programs Department. Professor Garvey holds degrees from Harvard College and Harvard Law School. While at Harvard he prepared, with Professor Abram Chayes, returning Legal Advisor to the U.S., Department of State, a casebook on public international law. Professor Garvey served as law clerk for Judge Hubert L. Will of the U.S. Federal District Court in Chicago and also as legislative assistant and speechwriter for Senator George McGovern, with responsibility for foreign policy positioning of the McGovern campaign for the Presidency of the United States. Professor Garvey practiced international law in San Francisco with the firm of Graham and James. Professor Garvey has authored numerous articles on international law, appearing in the Yale Law Journal, the American Journal of International Law, The Oxford Journal of Conflict and Security Law, the Berkeley Journal of International Law and the Harvard Journal of International Law, among others. He has taught in, and directed, numerous international legal programs in numerous countries. He served in Brazil as a Fulbright Senior Specialist, in Vietnam lecturing before government officials on US/Vietnam economic relations under grant from the U.S. State Department Public Affairs Office, in Australia as Parker Fellow at the University of Sidney, and was appointed Fellow of the Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, and Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Law School. Professor Garvey was consultant in Israel and in the Palestinian terrirories to the Government of Israel and the United Nations Agency, UNRWA, concerning Palestinian/Israeli security and economic relations.

Résumé
Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain proposes a new legal and institutional framework for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its proposal is designed to remedy the widely acknowledged breakdown of the architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on which we can no longer rely for global nuclear security. First, Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation defines the distinctively dangerous character of contemporary nuclear risk and explains why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty no longer provides a viable foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. It then sets out the reforms needed in order to limit the radical increase in availability, for rogue governments and terrorists, of nuclear weapons related material and technology. Garvey proposes a new counterproliferation architecture, to be built on presently available scientific, legal, and institutional resources, which could achieve a critical reduction of nuclear risk and an expanded deterrence. Guiding principles for establishing this new architecture are formulated, including, most importantly, the principal mechanism for implementation, a United Nations Security Council Counterproliferation Resolution applying equally for all states. This book presents what may be our best opportunity to secure a profoundly more effective global nuclear security and counter the world's current course to a catastrophic nuclear detonation.

Contenu

I. Introduction A. The Need for a New Counterproliferation Foundation B. The Old Grand Bargain Breakdown i. The Goal of Nuclear Disarmament ii. The Flawed Nexus of Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Counterproliferation C. Legitimacy; The Challenge of Asymmetric Possession of Nuclear Weapons II. Futility of Nuclear Risk Management in a Purely Consensual Regime A. Nuclear Terrorism B. State-to-State Nuclear Weapons Risk C. Risk Reduction by Consent III. Security Council Mandate of Universal Standards A. 'Global Legislation' by the United Nations Security Council i. The Security Council as Global Legislator ii. The Legal Debate iii. The Legal Debate Enlightened by Political Realism iv. Counterproliferation as Best Prospect for Security Council Legislation B. Counterproliferation Beyond Current 'Legislation' C.Universal Standards i. Nuclear Security as an Independent International Interest ii. No Classification of States iii. International Administration of Universal Standards IV. Elements of an Effective Counterproliferation Architecture A. Expanding Deterrence; An International Nuclear Forensics Data Bank i. Contemporary Nuclear Forensics Capability ii. Expanded Deterrence iii. The Legal and Institutional Empowerment of Nuclear Forensics B. The Internationalization of Counterproliferation Intelligence i. The Incongruity of National Intelligence Resources and Transnational Nuclear Risk ii. The Imperative for International Institutionalization of Intelligence iii. Feasibility C. Export-Import Control i. The Club that Cannot Counter-Proliferate ii. Institutionalization of Export-Import Controls under Security Council Mandate D. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle E. Interdiction of Nuclear Weapons Related Transport; The Proliferation Security Initiative i. Counterproliferation Designed to be Least Legal; 'An Activity, Not an Organization' ii. Interface of the Proliferation Security Initiative and International Law a. Coastal State Jurisdiction b. High Seas Jurisdiction c. Self-Defense iii. Institutionalization of the Proliferation Security Initiative under Security Council Mandate; Legitimacy and Effectiveness V. Compliance VI. Political Will VII. Conclusion