Reconceptualizing Deterrence

This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the Middle East.

The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of stability over credibility; however, because the logic of conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly signaling.

This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence. It explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a process that culminates in the internalization of deterrence within enduring rivalries is better suited to account for its final success: a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long.

This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security, Middle Eastern studies and IR in general.

Auteur

Elli Lieberman is a Lecturer on International Relations at the Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies and at Loyola University Maryland. His work has appeared in Security Studies, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and several books. He is a MacArthur Scholar recipient.

Contenu

1. Theoretical Considerations 2. The Israeli-Egyptian Rivalry, 1948-1973 Part I: From Failure to Success, 1948-1967 Part II: Turning Point: The Six-Day War Part III: "Design Around I": The War of Attrition Part IV: "Design Around II" The Yom Kippur War 3. The Israeli-Hezbollah Rivalry Conclusion