The Fed and Lehman Brothers

Advance praise: 'The official narrative of any crisis is not always the most accurate. Professor Laurence M. Ball's authoritative account of Lehman's demise debunks the Fed's narrative of the calamity and raises uncomfortable questions about the Fed's inconsistent use of its discretionary authority. This captivating book should be required reading for anyone with a stake in preventing the next financial collapse.' Athanasios Orphanides, Professor of the Practice of Global Economics and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Auteur

Laurence M. Ball is Professor of Economics at The Johns Hopkins University. He has previously worked as a Visiting Scholar at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, foreign central banks including the Bank of England and Bank of Japan, and at the International Monetary Fund. His current research topics include the long-term damage from the Great Recession and the case for raising central banks' inflation targets to four percent.

Texte du rabat

This book sets the record straight on why the Federal Reserve failed to rescue Lehman Brothers during the financial crisis.

Résumé
This book will interest scholars and practitioners in economics, finance, accounting and law; all areas in which the Lehman bankruptcy has been a major controversy. It will also appeal to a broad audience who care about the causes of the financial crisis and the role of the Federal Reserve's leaders.

Contenu

1. Introduction; 2. The crisis of 2008; 3. The legal criteria for Fed assistance; 4. Lehman's balance sheet and solvency; 5. Lehman's liquidity crisis; 6. Lehman's collateral and the feasibility of liquidity support; 7. Fed discussions of collateral and liquidity support; 8. Fed actions that ensured Lehman's bankruptcy; 9. Possible long-term outcomes for Lehman; 10. How risky were the Fed's rescues of other firms?; 11. Who decided that Lehman should fail?; 12. Explaining the Lehman decision; 13. Conclusion; References; Endnotes; Index.