Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger

§ 1. Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic. The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universallyl received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"2 will, if 3 the conclusions reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological /I superiority" over Husserl. This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisan ship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenome nological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy.

Résumé
Reassesses the phenomenological "controversy" between Hesserl and Heidegger over the proper status of the phenomenon of intentionality. It aims to determine whether the latter's hermeneutical critique of intentionality is sensitive to Husserl's reflective account of its "sachen selbst".

Contenu
One Husserl's Phenomenological Account of Intentionality.- One: Husserl's Phenomenological Method.- Two: The Intentionality of Logical Significance and Material Ontological Meaning.- Three: The intentionality of Psychologically Pure Consciousness.- Four: The Intentionality of Transcendentally Pure Consciousness.- Two Heidegger's Phenomenological Account of Intentionality.- Five: Heidegger's Concept of Phenomenology.- Six: The Phenomenological Inquiry into the Being of Intentionality.- Seven: Being in the World Manifests Dasein's Original Transcendence.- Eight: The Temporal Meaning of Transcendence.- Three The Confrontation of Husserl's and Heidegger's Accounts of Intentionality.- Nine: The Phenomenological Method: Reflective or Hermeneutical?.- Ten: Intentionality: An Original or Derived Phenomenon?.- Four Discussion of the Conclusions.- Eleven: Gadamer's Assessment of the Controversy between Husserl and Heidegger.- Twelve: Ricoeur's Attempted Rapprochement Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics.- Thirteen: Mohanty's Account of the Complementarity of Descriptive and Interpretive Phenomenology.- Fourteen: Crowell's Account of Husserl's and Heidegger's Divergent Interpretations of Phenomenology's Transcendental Character.- Fifteen: Landgrebe's Critique of Husserl's Theory of Phenomenological Reflection.- Table of Abbreviations.- Notes.- Selected Bibliography.