Nach dem langen Bürgerkrieg der 1990er Jahre galt Liberia unter der Präsidentschaft des Warlords Charles Taylor vielen Beobachtern als gescheiterter Staat. Seit der Machtübernahme durch Ellen Johnson Sirleaf im Jahr 2006 wird die Landesentwicklung weithin als Erfolgsgeschichte bewertet. Felix Gerdes zeigt, welche strukturellen Änderungen zu diesem Wandel und damit zur relativen Stabilisierung führten. Seine Analysen machen deutlich, dass die liberianischen Kriege gerade nicht die Zerstörung des Staates bedeuteten, sondern als Teil des Prozesses der Staatsbildung zu verstehen sind. Die Betrachtungen der Kontinuitäten und Brüche der politischen Verfasstheit Liberias ermöglichen eine fundierte Bewertung der anhaltenden strukturellen Probleme der Nachkriegsordnung.

Préface
Mikropolitik der Gewalt Micropolitics of Violence Herausgegeben von Klaus Schlichte und Peter Waldmann

Auteur
Felix Gerdes, Dr.phil., ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Forschungsstelle Kriege der Universität Hamburg.

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Nach dem langen Bürgerkrieg der 1990er Jahre galt Liberia unter der Präsidentschaft des Warlords Charles Taylor vielen Beobachtern als gescheiterter Staat. Seit der Machtübernahme durch Ellen Johnson Sirleaf im Jahr 2006 wird die Landesentwicklung weiterhin als Erfolgsgeschichte bewertet. Felix Gerdes zeigt, welche strukturellen Änderungen zu diesem Wandel und damit zur relativen Stabilisierung führten. Seine Analysen machen deutlich, dass die liberianischen Kriege gerade nicht die Zerstörung des Staates bedeuteten, sondern als Teil des Prozesses der Staatsbildung zu verstehen sind. Die Betrachtungen der Kontinuitäten und Brüche der politischen Verfasstheit Liberias ermöglichen eine fundierte Bewertung der anhaltenden strukturellen Probleme der Nachkriegsordnung.

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Introduction In late June 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced debt relief worth some 4.6 billion dollars for Liberia (cf. IMF June 29, 2010). For this tiny country of roughly 3.5 million inhabitants, this did not only represent significantly improved long-term economic perspectives, it was also of great symbolic importance and signaled the definitive readmission of Liberia into the international community. For more than a decade, the country had been best known for its devastating wars, and was widely regarded a "failed state" (cf. Pham 2004). Yet only a few years after the last war ended in 2003, Liberia started being hailed as a success story. More than anything else, observers lauded the country for its political progress as evidenced by the democratic election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005, its maintenance of significant civil liberties thereafter, and the introduction of technocratic economic policy reforms. Hence, the IMF's First Deputy Managing Director stressed that "it was the sustained implementation of a strong macroeconomic program and ambitious reform agenda by the government of President Johnson Sirleaf" (IMF June 30, 2010, italics original) which convinced the Bretton Woods Institutions to support debt relief. The contrast with Liberia's international reputation just a few years earlier is striking. Not only was the state seen as having collapsed, but the country was considered the "eye in the regional storm" (ICG 2003b), wreaking havoc on its neighbors and destabilizing West Africa. This perspective developed and became prominent during the First Liberian War from 1989 to 1996, when the country was the scene of West Africa's bloodiest internal conflict. During these years, some 60,000 to 80,000 people died as a direct result of fighting (Ellis 2007a, 316). As the powers of the central government eroded and the formal economy crumbled, armed factions accumulated powers and traded the country's natural resources. At times, it appeared that faction leaders were making fortunes out of war (cf. Reno 1998). The Second Liberian War from 2000 to 2003 only served to reinforce notions of Liberia as a "failed state", i.e. one providing virtually no services to its citizens and subject to political dynamics promoting use of violence as a means of politics (cf. Pham 2004). The phenomenon of simultaneous destruction and acquisition of wealth apparent in many civil wars prompted academic observers to think of these wars as specific societal systems characterized by specific opportunities to gain power and wealth. Powerful war-time actors, it is argued, are used to realizing their chances within the parameters of these systems. As they are "doing well out of war", the situation is considered to further their economic interests (Collier 2000). Political dynamics arguably work in concert with economic ones. Keen (1998; 2000) argues that war constitutes an environment perfectly suited to both governments and warlords who want to eliminate opponents, repress organized opposition and maintain authoritarian forms of domination. Warring factions may therefore be interested in perpetuating war, rather than winning it. Neo-liberal economic policies are often considered the background to civil wars, although analysts emphasize different aspects. Reno (1998; 2000) stresses declining state revenues as a result of neo-liberal policy re-forms imposed by the Bretton Woods Institutions. In consequence, rulers cut back on social services and patronage transfers, which entails an ero-sion of legitimacy. In weak states, political elites tend to exert significant personal control over economic and social capital, and these resources can be used to mobilize armed resistance once these elites have been excluded from state patronage. As warlords, these elites commercialize natural resources and generate profits but do not have to shoulder the expenses of states, rendering their informal networks competitive political actors vis-à-vis genuine states. According to Reno's argument, a major structural transformation of the international system has been at the root of the emergence of warlord systems. During the Cold War, the world's superpowers alimented "Third World" rulers and, in consequence, absolved them from the need to build self-sustaining systems of domination. The end of the Cold War and an associated re-ordering of the world on the basis of neo-liberal principles entailed the collapse of weak states and created opportunities for alternative systems of domination. Kurtenbach and Lock (2004), by contrast, emphasize socio-economic factors. According to their argument, neo-liberal reforms imposed from outside since the end of the Cold War have led to a massive decline in formal sector employment in less advanced economies, because of public sector retrenchment. As a consequence, the informal sector (rather than competitive formal business) grows. Economic informalization further diminishes the tax base of the state. State capacity is consequently further reduced, resulting in weaker law enforcement. This in turn leads to growth of the criminal economy. Migration, equally reinforced by the retrenchment of the formal sector, enables criminal networks to expand beyond their home countries ("shadow globalization"). Autonomous economic accumulation allows these networks to accumulate power, forge cooperative relations with state agencies, and impose their interests by means of violence (Kurtenbach/Lock 2004, 22-23). Although competition between these clandestine networks does not necessarily or even predominantly take on the form of war, it is associated with levels of violence that may be higher than those experienced during war (cf. Lock 2004, 58-60). While some form of peace may still be achievable, transformation of war-torn states appears impossible in th…