The Phenomenological Movement

The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history has itself a history which is pertinent to its objective. It may suitably be opened by the following excerpts from a review which Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, the Head of the Division for International Cultural Cooperation, Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco from 1953 to 56, wrote in 1950 from France: The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The average American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real impon of what is said into the kind of imalysis with which he is familiar . . . . No doubt, American education will graduaUy take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophical literature. ' These sentences clearly implied a challenge, if not a mandate, to all those who by background and interpretive ability were in a position to meet it.

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1. The Phenomenological Movement Defined.- 2. Unrelated Phenomenologies.- a. Extra-Philosophical Phenomenologies.- b. Philosophical Phenomenologies.- 3. Preview.- One / The Preparatory Phase.- I. Franz Brentano (1838-1917): Forerunner of the Phenomenological Movement.- 1. Brentano's Place in the History of Phenomenology.- 2. His Purpose: A Scientific Reformation of Philosophy.- 3. A New Psychology as the Foundation for Scientific Philosophy.- 4. A New Type of Empiricism.- 5. Descriptive Psychology versus Genetic Psychology.- 6. A New Type of Experience: Inner Perception versus Introspection.- 7. "Intentionality": The Basic Psychological Phenomenon.- 8. A "Natural" Classification of Psychical Acts.- 9. A Fundamental Law of Psychical Phenomena.- 10. The Awareness of Time.- 11. An Analogue of Self-Evidence as the Basis for Ethical Knowledge.- 12. Brentano's Fight against "Fictitious Entities".- 13. How Far Was Brentano a Representative of "Psychologism"?.- Selective Bibliography.- II. Carl Stumpf (1848-1936): Founder of Experimental Phenomenology.- 1. Stumpf's Place in the History of Phenomenology.- 2. The Role of Phenomenology in His Work.- 3. General Characteristics of His Phenomenology.- a. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology Consists of Primary and Secondary Phenomena.- b. Phenomenology is a Neutral Science or Pre-Science (Vorwissenschaft).- c. Phenomenology is the First of the Neutral Pre-Sciences.- d. Phenomenology is Not an Independent Discipline for Specialists, but Rather the First Layer in the Study of Every Established Science.- e. Phenomenology, while a Descriptive Science, has to be Studied by All Suitable Methods, Including the Experimental One.- 4. Some Concrete Phenomenological Contributions.- a. The Distinction between Dependent and Independent Parts and the Experience of Substance and Attribute.- b. The Experience of Causal Nexus.- c. The Experience of "Feel-Sensations" (Gefühlsempfindungen).- d. The Discovery of Structural Laws among Empirical Materials Not Based upon Induction.- e. The Discovery of the Sachverhalt.- 5. The Relationship of Stumpf's and Husserl's Phenomenologies.- Excursus: Stumpf's Phenomenology and William James's Psychology.- Selective Bibliography.- Two / The German Phase of the Movement.- III. The Pure Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).- A. Introductory.- B. Constants in Husserl's Conception of Philosophy.- 1. The Ideal of Rigorous Science.- 2. Philosophic Radicalism.- 3. The Ethos of Radical Autonomy.- 4. The Wonder of All Wonders: Subjectivity.- 5. Husserl's Personality and His Philosophy.- C. Variables in the Development of Husserl's Philosophy.- 1. The Pre-Phenomenological Period.- a. The Critique of Psychologism.- b. The Conception of a Pure Logic.- Excursus: Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie and Husserl's Logic.- 2. The Beginnings of Phenomenology as the Subjective Correlate of Pure Logic.- a. Husserl's Semantics.- b. Husserl's Doctrine of Universals (Essences).- c. The Intentionality of Consciousness.- Excursus: William James's Significance for Husserl's Phenomenology.- d. Phenomenological Intuiting (Anschauung and Wesensschau).- 3. Phenomenology Becomes "First Philosophy".- Excursus: Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl.- 4. The Birth of the Phenomenological Movement and the Beginnings of Transcendental Phenomenology.- a. Self-Givenness - Phenomenology and Positivism.- b. Phenomenology of Perception and Self-Evidence.- c. The Phenomenological Reduction.- Excursus: Santayana's Ultimate Scepticism Compared with Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction.- d. The Phenomenological Residue: Ego Cogito Cogitata Mea.- e. Phenomenological Idealism.- Excursus: Husserl and Josiah Royce.- f. Phenomenological Constitution and the Consciousness of Time.- g. Phenomenology and Psychology.- 5. Toward a System of Transcendental Phenomenology.- Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Monadology.- 6. The Last Beginning.- The Idea of the Life-World (Lebenswelt).- D. In Place of an Appraisal.- Postscript 1980.- Selective Bibliography.- IV. The Original Phenomenological Movement.- A. The Phenomenological Circles.- 1. The Göttingen Circle.- 2. The Munich Circle.- B. Alexander Pfänder (1870-1941): From Phenomenological Psychology to Phenomenological Philosophy.- 1. Pfänder's Place in the Phenomenological Movement.- 2. The Place of Phenomenology in His Philosophy.- 3. His Conception of Phenomenology.- a. Phenomenological Psychology.- b. Phenomenological Philosophy.- 4. Examples of His Phenomenology.- a. Directed Sentiments (Gesinnungen).- b. Basic and Empirical Essences.- c. The Perception of Oughtness.- 5. Concluding Remarks.- Selective Bibliography.- 6. Pfänder's Following: Maximilian Beck, Gerda Walther, Herbert Spiegelberg, Josef Stürmann.- C. Adolf Reinach (1883-1917): Phenomenological Ontology of Essences.- 1. Reinach's Place in the Phenomenological Movement.- 2. His Conception of Phenomenology.- 3. Illustrations of His Phenomenology.- a. A Theory of Social Acts.- b. Essential Laws Concerning Legal Entities.- Selective Bibliography.- D. Moritz Geiger (1880-1937): From Phenomenological Esthetics to ward Metaphysics.- 1. Geiger's Conception of Phenomenology.- 2. Illustrations of His Phenomenological Analyses.- a. Esthetic Enjoyment.- b. Existential Depth.- c. The Unconscious.- Selective Bibliography.- E. Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966): Phenomenology and Reality (by Eberhard Avé-Lallemant).- 1. Conrad-Martius's Place in the Phenomenological Movement.- 2. Her Conception of Phenomenology.- 3. The Phenomenon of Reality.- 4. Philosophy of Nature on Phenomenological Foundations.- 5. Toward an Appraisal.- Selective Bibliography.- F. Roman Ingarden (1893-1970): Ontological Phenomenology (by Guido Küng).- 1. Ingarden's Place in the Phenomenological Movement.- 2. His Conception of Phenomenology.- 3. A Phenomenologist's Analysis of the Idealism-Realism Controversy.- 4. The Phenomenology of the Work of Art.- 5. Toward an Appraisal.- Selective Bibliography.- G. Other Members of the Göttingen and Munich Circles.- 1. August Gallinger (1871-1959).- 2. Aloys Fischer (1880-1937).- 3. Theodor Conrad (1881-1969).- 4. Wilhelm Schapp (1884-1965).- 5. Kurt Stavenhagen (1885-1951).- 6. Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977).- 7. Hans Lipps (1889-1941).- 8. Adolf Grimme (1889-1963).- 9. Jean Hering (1890-1966).- 10. Edith Stein (1891-1942).- 11. Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964).- H. The Freiburg Group.- 1. The New Sett…