This book shows how the relationship between security and integration in Western Europe depends upon an enduring implicit bargain between the US and its European allies. Despite internal and external pressures to develop a European security and defence identity distinct from NATO in the 1980s and 1990s, EC member states have consistently rejected supranational integration in the areas of security and defence. Despite considerable European dissatisfaction with American leadership of NATO, Europe has continued to accept that leadership even after the end of the Cold War and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

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Acknowledgements - List of Abbreviations - Introduction - PART 1: HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND INTEGRATION (1945-1979) - Past as Prologue: the Historical Relationship between Integration and Security - The Theoretical Relationship between Integration and Security - PART 2: 'CRISIS IN THE ALLIANCE' AND WEST EUROPEAN RESPONSES (1979-1987) - The Changing External Dimension: US-European Divergences - Fragmented 'Sub-systems': the West European Response to Crisis - PART 3: EUROPE IN FLUX: INTERNAL INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL DISINTEGRATION (1987-1990) - Internal Dynamism and the Consequences of the Single European Act (SEA) - Changing External Dimension: the EC Takes the Lead - PART 4: SECURITY THREATS AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE EC AS A SECURITY ACTOR? (1990-1992) - Testing Times for Security Aspirations: 'the EC Must Take the Lead' - Maastricht and the Grand Compromise - Conclusion: The EC and Security: Continuity within a Changing Relationship - Index