Bienvenue chez nous!
Logo Ex Libris

Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954-1960

  • Livre Relié
  • 288 Nombre de pages
This book reveals the extent to which the UK clung on to great-power pretensions in the Middle East 1954-60 and used bluff to give... Lire la suite
CHF 189.00
Habituellement expédié sous 3 semaines.

Description

This book reveals the extent to which the UK clung on to great-power pretensions in the Middle East 1954-60 and used bluff to give the impression that it disposed of greater military resources than was the case.

Auteur

Michael J. Cohen holds the Lazarus Philips Chair in History at the University of Bar-Ilan. In 1998 he was a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, and has been Visiting Professor at the Universities of Stanford, Duke, Chapel Hill and Maryland, in the USA and at the LSE in London. He has published eight books on Israel and the Middle East.



Texte du rabat

The period covered by this book, 1954-60, witnessed a significant change in Allied strategy for the Middle East. Its focus switched from Egypt to the states of the so-called northern tier of the Middle East: Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. Allied planning focused now on holding up a future Soviet offensive against the Middle East at the strategic passes that cut through the Zagros mountains, across the Iraqi-Iranian border. This was to be done with the indigenous ground forces of the northern tier states, complemented by Allied strategic and tactical nuclear bombing.
In 1955, the Baghdad Pact became the political expression of the new strategy. The economic and strategic interests of the West in the Middle East provide the context for the tumultuous events of this period: the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 for the evacuation of Egypt; the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955; the Suez Crisis which, together with the escalating Arab-Israeli conflict, erupted into open war in November 1956; and finally, the crises that rocked the Middle East in July 1958: the fall of the Hashemite dynasty and the ancient regime in Iraq, and the British and American military interventions in Jordan and the Lebanon respectively.
These last events constituted the final act in a drama that had begun in 1955. They effectively marked the end of the Allies' 'northern tier' strategy. In the spring of 1959 Iraq seceded from the Baghdad Pact, and the rump was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENT). This book reveals the extent to which the UK clung on to great-power pretensions and used bluff, even deception, in order to give the impression that she disposed of greater military resources thanwas in fact the case. It describes not only Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, but also the Americans' reluctance to take over Britain's former hegemony in the region. Finally, it reveals the extent to which the Allies' relationship with Israel was a constant restrai

Contenu

Acknowledgements Introduction Abbreviations List of Maps 1. Allied Global Strategy 2. Allied Interests in the Middle East 3. The British Strategic Concept 4. The Arab-Israeli Problem 5. The Northern Tier Takes Shape 6. The Formation of the Baghdad Pact 7. Anglo-American-Turkish Staff Planning, 1955 8. Baghdad Pact Planning, 1955-56 9. Allied Intervention in a Middle East War, 1955-56 10. The Consequences of Suez 11. Allied Strategy in the Middle East after Suez 12. From the Baghdad Pact to CENTO Conclusion Bibliography Index

Détails sur le produit

Titre: Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954-1960
Sous-titre: Defending the Northern Tier
Auteur:
Code EAN: 9780714656304
ISBN: 978-0-7146-5630-4
Format: Livre Relié
Editeur: Taylor & Francis Ltd
Genre: Sciences politiques
nombre de pages: 288
Poids: 568g
Taille: H234mm x B156mm
Année: 2004