Descriptive Theories of Bargaining

This monograph presents a pair of new descriptive theories for two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form. The three-person game is shown to give better predictions than other theories.

Texte du rabat

This book deals with two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form and presents two new descriptive theories, the Negotiation Agreement Area and the Proportional Division Payoff Bounds (PDPB). The evaluation of data for two-person games leads to a new descriptive theory called Negotiation Agreement Area which combines the influence of power and justice norms. The main emphasis of the book is on a new descriptive theory for three-person games, the PDPB. Comparison with other theories on the basis of 3088 plays of different games shows that the PDPB are significantly more successful in prediction than other theories. The PDPB concept is a modification and extension of Selten's Equal Division Payoff Bounds. The determination of the bounds is based on general principles and not on the estimation of parameters. From aspiration levels which depend on power, justice norms, and other reasonable principles the negotiation process leads to a proportional division of the prize.

Contenu

1. Introduction.- 2. Notations and Definitions of Characteristic Function Games.- 2.1 Measurement of Predictive Success.- 2.2 Prominence Level.- 3. Two-Person Bargaining Games.- 3.1 Programs for Computer-Controlled Two-Person Bargaining Games.- 3.2 Experimental Design.- 3.3 The Negotiation Agreement Area.- 3.4 Evaluation of Two Pilot Experiments.- 3.5 Summary on Two-Person Games.- 4. Three-Person Bargaining Games.- 4.1 Programs for Computer-Controlled Three-Person Bargaining Games.- 4.2 Experimental Design.- 4.3 Theories of Coalition Formation.- 4.4 Experimental Results.- 4.5 Summary on Three-Person Games.- 5. Summary and Conclusion.- A. Introduction to the Rules and the Experimental Apparatus of a Two-Person Bargaining Experiment.- B. Introduction to the Rules and the Experimental Apparatus of a Three-Person Bargaining Experiment.- C. Listing of All Results.- References.