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Deterrence by Diplomacy

  • Couverture cartonnée
  • 164 Nombre de pages
Challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness... Lire la suite
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Challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic. This book argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable.


Anne E. Sartori is associate professor of political science at Northwestern University.

Texte du rabat

""Deterrence by Diplomacy" brings together several key issues in international politics--credibility, crisis bargaining, reputations, the interconnectedness of commitments, costly signaling, and diplomacy. It connects several important ideas in international politics and contributes to their development."--Robert Powell, University of California, Berkeley, author of "In the Shadow of Power" "This well-written book is a pleasure to read, and I learned a great deal from it. Sartori presents complex ideas in an accessible manner, and provides a compelling example of both the use of formal models in analyzing complex problems and the sophisticated use of statistical methods."--R. Harrison Wagner, University of Texas at Austin


Preface ix Part I: Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 3 Three Misconceptions About Diplomacy 6 How Can a State Communicate That an Adversary Has Misjudged Its Resolve? 12 Overview of the Book 14 Part II: How Bluffs Can Hurt a State's Diplomacy, and Honesty Provides the Ability to Communicate 17 Chapter 2: The Failure of Chinese Diplomacy, 1950 19 The Chinese Attempt at Deterrence 22 The U.S. Dismissal of China's Threats as Bluffs 26 Would the United States and China Have Fought if China's Threats Had Been Credible? 30 Why Did the United States Dismiss China's Threats As Bluffs? 32 Conclusion 41 Chapter 3 A Reputational Theory of Diplomacy 43 Reputations for Honesty and Reputations for Resolve 44 Audience Costs, Cheap Talk, and Diplomacy 49 The Game-Theoretic Model 52 Effective, Cheap Diplomacy 56 Conclusion 71 Part III: Evidence That Honesty Matters 73 Chapter 4: Reputations for Honesty and the Success of Diplomacy 75 Central Empirical Implications of the Formal Model 77 Determining Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Model 78 Data and Methodology 81 The Escalation of International Disputes:Tests of the Theory 93 Robustness of the Empirical Results 99 Conclusion 109 Chapter 5: The Broader Importance of Reputations for Honesty 111 The Effect of the Defender's Reputation on States' Decisions to Begin Militarized Disputes and to Attempt Deterrence 112 The Role of the Military Balance 114 Conclusion 118 Part IV: Conclusion 121 Chapter 6: Conclusion 123 Part V: Appendixes 129 Appendix A: Characterization of the Equilibrium 131 Factorization 136 Choosing Thresholds So That Each Player-Type Prefers Its Equilibrium Strategy to Other Strategies Played in Equilibrium 139 Checking That No Player Prefers to Deviate to a Strategy No Type Plays in Equilibrium 141 No Player Prefers to Deviate at a Node Other Than the Player's First Node in the Stage Game 145 Appendix B: The Impact of Communication on War and on Welfare 146 Appendix C: Implications of the Theory 149 Appendix D: The E ffects of Power Status, Contiguity, and Democracy 151 Bibliography 153 Index 161

Informations sur le produit

Titre: Deterrence by Diplomacy
Code EAN: 9780691134000
ISBN: 978-0-691-13400-0
Format: Couverture cartonnée
Editeur: Princeton Univ Pr
Genre: Sciences de la terre
nombre de pages: 164
Poids: 263g
Taille: H232mm x B159mm x T11mm
Année: 2007


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