Bienvenue chez nous!
Logo Ex Libris

Deterrence by Diplomacy

  • Couverture cartonnée
  • 176 Nombre de pages
(0) Donner la première évaluation
Évaluations
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
Afficher toutes les évaluations
Challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness... Lire la suite
CHF 38.90
Habituellement expédié sous 1 semaine.

Description

Challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic. This book argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable.

Auteur

Anne E. Sartori is associate professor of political science at Northwestern University.

Texte du rabat

Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic.

Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important. Departing from traditional theory, this book shows that rather than always fighting over small issues to show resolve, states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing over lesser issues--by not crying "wolf."



Contenu

Preface ix Part I: Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 3 Three Misconceptions About Diplomacy 6 How Can a State Communicate That an Adversary Has Misjudged Its Resolve? 12 Overview of the Book 14 Part II: How Bluffs Can Hurt a State's Diplomacy, and Honesty Provides the Ability to Communicate 17 Chapter 2: The Failure of Chinese Diplomacy, 1950 19 The Chinese Attempt at Deterrence 22 The U.S. Dismissal of China's Threats as Bluffs 26 Would the United States and China Have Fought if China's Threats Had Been Credible? 30 Why Did the United States Dismiss China's Threats As Bluffs? 32 Conclusion 41 Chapter 3 A Reputational Theory of Diplomacy 43 Reputations for Honesty and Reputations for Resolve 44 Audience Costs, Cheap Talk, and Diplomacy 49 The Game-Theoretic Model 52 Effective, Cheap Diplomacy 56 Conclusion 71 Part III: Evidence That Honesty Matters 73 Chapter 4: Reputations for Honesty and the Success of Diplomacy 75 Central Empirical Implications of the Formal Model 77 Determining Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Model 78 Data and Methodology 81 The Escalation of International Disputes:Tests of the Theory 93 Robustness of the Empirical Results 99 Conclusion 109 Chapter 5: The Broader Importance of Reputations for Honesty 111 The Effect of the Defender's Reputation on States' Decisions to Begin Militarized Disputes and to Attempt Deterrence 112 The Role of the Military Balance 114 Conclusion 118 Part IV: Conclusion 121 Chapter 6: Conclusion 123 Part V: Appendixes 129 Appendix A: Characterization of the Equilibrium 131 Factorization 136 Choosing Thresholds So That Each Player-Type Prefers Its Equilibrium Strategy to Other Strategies Played in Equilibrium 139 Checking That No Player Prefers to Deviate to a Strategy No Type Plays in Equilibrium 141 No Player Prefers to Deviate at a Node Other Than the Player's First Node in the Stage Game 145 Appendix B: The Impact of Communication on War and on Welfare 146 Appendix C: Implications of the Theory 149 Appendix D: The E ffects of Power Status, Contiguity, and Democracy 151 Bibliography 153 Index 161

Informations sur le produit

Titre: Deterrence by Diplomacy
Auteur:
Code EAN: 9780691134000
ISBN: 978-0-691-13400-0
Format: Couverture cartonnée
Editeur: Princeton University Press
Genre: Sciences de la terre
nombre de pages: 176
Poids: 257g
Taille: H234mm x B156mm x T9mm
Année: 2007