This is a comprehensive textbook covering all of the topics taught in the graduate-level, two-semester course in microeconomic theory required of all graduate students in economics. It combines the results of the authors' experience of teaching microeconomics at Harvard and has been fully classroom tested.

Zusatztext This impressive piece is bound soon to become a standard reference for those teaching microeconomics at the graduate level ... this book reads reasonably well and covers virtually all the material on microeconomic theory that can be taught to doctoral students up to date ... The obvious qualities of this book are clarity and lucidity. In most cases! precise definitions and formal proofs of propositions are supplied! accompanied by appropriate remarks! discussions!and examples. Not only does this rigorous treatment help readers to get a clear idea of the basic theory! but also! as an important byproduct! it teaches them how to reconstruct the proofs themselves ... the main quality of this book is probably that the recourse to abstraction is never fortuitous:it is always justified by a research conciseness and is systematically motivated by simple yet convincing illustrations. Klappentext This is a comprehensive textbook covering all of the topics taught in the graduate-level, two-semester course in microeconomic theory required of all graduate students in economics. It combines the results of the authors' experience of teaching microeconomics at Harvard and has been fully classroom tested. Zusammenfassung This textbook aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the essentials of microeconomics. It offers unprecedented depth of coverage, whilst allowing lecturers to 'tailor-make' their courses to suit personal priorities. Covering topics such as noncooperative game theory, information economics, mechanism design and general equilibrium under uncertainty, it is written in a clear, accessible and engaging style and provides practice exercises and a full appendix ofterminology. Inhaltsverzeichnis PART I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING ; Introduction to Part I ; 1. Preference and Choice ; 2. Consumer Choice ; 3. Classical Demand Theory ; 4. Aggregate Demand ; 5. Production ; 6. Choice under Uncertainty ; PART II: GAME THEORY ; Introduction to Part II ; 7. Chapter 7: Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games ; 8. Chapter 8: Simultaneous-Move Games ; 9. Chapter 9: Dynamic Games ; PART III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE ; Introduction to Part III ; 10. Chapter 10: Competitive Markets ; 11. Extrnalities and Public Goods ; 12. Market Power ; 13. Adverse Selection! Signalling! and Screening ; 14. The Principal-Agent Problem ; PART IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ; Introduction to Part IV ; 15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples ; 16. Equilibrium and its Basic Welfare Properties ; 17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium ; 18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria ; 19. General Equilibrium under Uncertainty ; 20. Equilibrium and Time ; PART V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES ; Introduction to Part V ; 21. Social Choice Theory ; 22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining ; 23. Incentives and Mechanism Design ; Mathematical Appendix ...

Contenu
Part I: Individual Decision-Making; Introduction to Part I; Chapter 1: Preference and Choice; Chapter 2: Consumer Choice; Chapter 3: Classical Demand Theory; Chapter 4: Aggregate Demand; Chapter 5: Production; Chapter 6: Choice under Uncertainty; Part II: Game Theory; Introduction to Part II; Chapter 7: Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games; Chapter 8: Simultaneous-Move Games; Chapter 9: Dynamic Games; Part III: Market Equilibrium and Market Failure; Introduction to Part III; Chapter 10: Competitive Markets; Chapter 11: Externalities and Public Goods; Chapter 12: Market Power; Chapter 13: Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening; Chapter 14: The Principal-Agent Problem; Part IV: General Equilibrium; Introduction to Part IV; Chapter 15: General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples; Chapter 16: Equilibrium and its Basic Welfare Properties; Chapter 17: The Positive Theory of Equilibrium; Chapter 18: Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria; Chapter 19: General Equilibrium under Uncertainty; Chapter 20: Equilibrium and Time; Part V: Welfare Economics and Incentives; Introduction to Part V; Chapter 21: Social Choice Theory; Chapter 22: Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining; Chapter 23: Incentives and Mechanism Design.