The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology

Autorentext
John M. Doris is Peter L. Dyson Professor of Ethics in Organizations and Life at Cornell University. He has published widely in both scientific and philosophical journals, and been awarded fellowships from Michigan's Institute for the Humanities; Princeton's University Center for Human Values; the National Humanities Center; the American Council of Learned Societies; the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; the National Endowment for the Humanities. He authored Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, 2002) and Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency (Oxford, 2015), and with his colleagues in the Moral Psychology Research Group wrote and edited The Moral Psychology Handbook (Oxford, 2010). Manuel Vargas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (OUP) and a co-author of Four Views on Free Will (Wiley-Blackwell). He writes about agency, ethics, and the history of Latin American philosophy.

Klappentext

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology is a comprehensive, multidisciplinary, state-of-the-art overview of moral psychology. The 50 chapters, written by leading figures in both philosophy and psychology, cover many of the most important topics in the field and form the definitive survey of contemporary moral psychology.

Zusammenfassung
Moral psychology is the study of how human minds make and are made by human morality. This state-of-the-art volume covers contemporary philosophical and psychological work on moral psychology, as well as notable historical theories and figures in the field of moral psychology, such as Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, and the Buddha. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology's fifty chapters, authored by leading figures in the field, cover foundational topics, such as character, virtue, emotion, moral responsibility, the neuroscience of morality, weakness of will, and the nature of moral judgments and reasons. The volume also canvases emerging work in applied moral psychology, including adaptive preferences, animals, mental illness, poverty, marriage, race, bias, and victim blaming. Collectively, the essays form the definitive survey of contemporary moral psychology.

Inhalt

• Introduction

• I. History

• 1: Bronwyn Finnigan: Karma, Moral Responsibility, and Buddhist Ethics

• 2: Rachana Kamtekar: Plato: Moral Psychology

• 3: Agnes Callard: The Virtuous Spiral: Aristotle's Theory of Habituation

• 4: Terence Irwin: Reason as Servant of the Will: Some Critics of Aquinas

• 5: Rachel Cohon: Moral Sentiments in Hume and Adam Smith

• 6: Lucy Allais: From a priori respect to human frailty: optimism and pessimism in Kant's moral psychology

• 7: Brian Leiter: Nietzsche's Naturalistic Moral Psychology: Anti-Realism, Sentimentalism, Hard Incompatibilism

• II. Foundations

• 8: Samuel Asarnow and David Taylor: Judgment Internalism

• 9: Lorraine Besser: Virtue

• 10: David Brink and Dana Kay Nelkin: The Nature and Significance of Blame

• 11: Fiery Cushman, Arunima Sarin, and Mark Ho: Punishment as Communication

• 12: Stephen Darwall: The Moral Psychology of Respect

• 13: Justin D'Arms: Emotion Kinds, Motivation and Irrational Explanation

• 14: Julia Driver: Moral Expertise

• 15: Joshua Greene, Karen Huang, and Max Bazerman: Redirecting Rawlsian Reasoning Toward the Greater Good

• 16: Richard Holton: Self-Deception and the Moral Self

• 17: Dan Kelly: Two Ways to Adopt a Norm: The (Moral?) Psychology of Internalization and Avowal

• 18: Joshua Knobe: Morality and Possibility

• 19: Ron Mallon: Social Construction, Revelation, and Moral Psychology

• 20: Al Mele: Weakness of Will

• 21: John Mikhail: Moral Nativism

• 22: Susana Monso and Kristin Andrews: Animal Moral Psychologies

• 23: Shaun Nichols: Moral Learning and Moral Representations

• 24: Cailin O'Connor: Methods, Models, and the Evolution of Moral Psychology

• 25: Lauren Olin: The Moral Psychology of Humor

• 26: Adina Roskies: The Limits of Neuroscience for Ethics

• 27: Fernando Rudy: The Moral Psychology of Moral Responsibility

• 28: David Shoemaker and Kevin Tobia: Personal Identity

• 29: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Daryl Cameron: Some Potential Philosophical Lessons of Implicit Moral Attitudes

• 30: Michael Smith: The Nature of Reasons for Action and their Psychological Implications

• 31: Valerie Tiberius and Dan Haybron: Prudential Psychology: Theory, Method, and Measurement

• 32: Maria Waggoner, John Doris, and Manuel Vargas: Situationism, Moral Improvement, and Moral Responsibility

• III. Applications

• 33: Santiago Amaya: Negligence: its Moral Significance

• 34: Berit Brogaard: Sex By Deception

• 35: Mich Ciurria: The moral psychology of blame: A feminist analysis

• 36: Fiery Cushman and L. A. Paul: Are Desires Interdependent

• 37: Carly Giffin and Tania Lombrozo: Mens Rea in Moral Judgment and Criminal Law

• 38: Jesse Graham and Daniel A. Yudkin: Variations in Moral Concerns Across Political Ideology: Moral Foundations, Hidden Tribes, and Righteous Division

• 39: Serene Khader: Adapative Preferences and the Moral Psychology of Oppression

• 40: Stephen Macedo: Marriage, Monogamy, and Moral Psychology

• 41: Heidi Maibom: Empathy and Moral Understanding in Psychopathy

• 42: Emily McTernan: Moral Character, Liberal States, and Civic Education

• 43: Jennifer Morton: A Moral Psychology of Poverty?

• 44: Dominic Murphy and Natalia Washington: Agency in Mental Illness and Disability

• 45: Laura Niemi and Liane Young: The Moral Psychology of Victimization

• 46: Kathryn J. Norlock: Forgiveness and Moral Repair

• 47: Gideon Rosen: Accountability and Implicit Bias: A Study in Skepticism about Responsibility

• 48: Chandra Sripada: Loss of Control in Addiction: The Search for an Adequate Theory and the Case for Intellectual Humility

• 49: Monique Wonderly: Love and the Anatomy of Needing Another

• 50: Robin Zheng: Race and Moral Psychology