Willkommen, schön sind Sie da!
Logo Ex Libris

The Politics of IMF Lending

  • Fester Einband
  • 219 Seiten
(0) Erste Bewertung abgeben
Bewertungen
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
Alle Bewertungen ansehen
Informationen zum Autor Michael Breen As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the gl... Weiterlesen
CHF 134.00
Print on demand - Exemplar wird für Sie besorgt.
Kein Rückgaberecht!
Bestellung & Lieferung in eine Filiale möglich

Beschreibung

Informationen zum Autor Michael Breen Klappentext As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis. To come Zusammenfassung As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction PART I: THEORY 2. Who Controls the IMF? 3. Domestic Interests and IMF Programs 4. The Impact of the Shareholders on IMF Programs PART II: EVIDENCE 5. Testing the Argument 6. IMF Lending 7. IMF Lending and the Crisis in Europe 8. IMF Conditionality 9. IMF Conditionality and the Asian Crisis PART III: IMPLICATIONS 10. Theory, Evidence and Reform

Autorentext

Michael Breen



Klappentext

As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.



Inhalt

1. Introduction PART I: THEORY 2. Who Controls the IMF? 3. Domestic Interests and IMF Programs 4. The Impact of the Shareholders on IMF Programs PART II: EVIDENCE 5. Testing the Argument 6. IMF Lending 7. IMF Lending and the Crisis in Europe 8. IMF Conditionality 9. IMF Conditionality and the Asian Crisis PART III: IMPLICATIONS 10. Theory, Evidence and Reform

Produktinformationen

Titel: The Politics of IMF Lending
Autor:
EAN: 9781137263803
ISBN: 978-1-137-26380-3
Format: Fester Einband
Genre: Medien & Kommunikation
Anzahl Seiten: 219
Gewicht: 415g
Größe: H19mm x B222mm x T148mm
Jahr: 2013
Auflage: 2013

Weitere Produkte aus der Reihe "International Political Economy Series"