From Valuing to Value

David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.

Sobel's essays in this book are some of the finest ever written in moral philosophy. Whatever one's favoured theory of value, I hope we can all agree that this book is an invaluable resource. Informationen zum Autor David Sobel is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. Much of his research has reflected an abiding interest in understanding and defending desire-based or subjectivist accounts of well-being and reasons for action. With Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall he co-edits Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Klappentext David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism. Zusammenfassung David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.

Autorentext
David Sobel is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. Much of his research has reflected an abiding interest in understanding and defending desire-based or subjectivist accounts of well-being and reasons for action. With Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall he co-edits Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy.

Inhalt

• Introduction

• 1: Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral

• 2: Full Information Accounts of Well-Being

• 3: On the Subjectivity of Welfare

• 4: Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration

• 5: Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?

• 6: Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action

• 7: Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action

• 8: (co-authored with David Copp): Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire

• 9: Varieties of Hedonism

• 10: (co-authored with David Copp): Morality and Virtue

• 11: Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste

• 12: The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection

• 13: Subjectivism and Idealization

• 14: Parfit s Case Against Subjectivism

• 15: Subjectivism and Proportionalism