The Fear of Invasion

This is a fundamentally new way of looking at the position of Britain in 1914. Most historians have assumed that what happened to the BEF had to happen. Morgan-Owen suggests otherwise, and his arguments will be required reading for anyone dealing with British policy on the outbreak of war. Was there an alternative to the Western Front? Did the incapacity of the navy condemn Britain to the killing fields of France and Flanders? Raising questions such as these will have a profound effect on the intellectual approach to the entire field. Few books manage such a feat. David Morgan-Owen has achieved a great deal with this first book. I look forward to his subsequent work, which might help settle some of the uncertainties he has now raised.

Autorentext

David G. Morgan-Owen is a lecturer in Defence Studies at King's College London. He was previously a Visiting Research Fellow at the National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth, and an Associate of the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies at the University of Exeter, where he gained his PhD in 2013. Dr. Morgan-Owen has published on British strategy before and during the First World War in the English Historical Review, War in History, Journal of Strategic Studies, and the International History Review.

Klappentext

In this new study of the lead-up to the Great War, David G. Morgan-Owen deals with an aspect of the war seldom discussed for the simple reason that it never actually came to pass: a German invasion of the United Kingdom. Morgan-Owen makes the case that this fear of invasion played a central role in the formation of British strategy.

Inhalt

• Introduction

• 1: The Command of the Sea

• 2: The Military Resources of the Empire

• 3: 'Practical Politics'

• 4: Preparing for War

• 5: The German Threat

• 6: The North Sea Guard

• 7: A Growing Burden

• 8: Surrendering the Initiative

• Conclusion